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In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins declared that
sex stereotyping was a prohibited form of sex discrimination at work. This seemingly
simple declaration has been the most important development in sex discrimination
jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII. It has been used to extend Title VII’s
coverage and to protect groups that were previously excluded. Astonishingly,
however, the contours, dimensions, and requirements of the prohibition have never
been clearly articulated by courts or scholars. In this paper I evaluate and reject the
interpretations most often offered by scholars—namely that the prohibition requires
either freedom of gender expression or sex-blind neutrality. I argue that the
prohibition reflects not a coherent antidiscrimination principle but a pragmatic
burden-shifting framework that turns on the compliance costs for the worker. I
conclude by arguing that the sex stereotyping prohibition has not lived up to its
rhetorical promise. Indeed, the implications of the prohibition are both dangerous
and ironic in ways that scholars have yet to recognize. While the prohibition has
extended Title VII’s protection to new classes of workers, it has done so by relying on
and reinforcing traditional gender categories. The result is that the prohibition
protects some individuals at the expense of the class whose subordination—
stemming from socially salient gender norms—remains intact.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins1 declared that
sex stereotyping was a prohibited form of sex discrimination at work.2 This
seemingly simple declaration has been the most important development in
sex discrimination jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII.3 It has
been the tool used to protect effeminate men and masculine women from
harassment in the workplace.4 More recently, it has been the catalyst for a
sea change in courts’ treatment of transsexuals.5 Transsexuals have gone
1
2

490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
In fact, the Supreme Court had condemned sex stereotyping since the 1970s. However, the
sex stereotyping at issue in the cases preceding Price Waterhouse involved ascriptive sex stereotyping, whereby women were excluded from certain opportunities because they were presumed to
have certain traits and attributes that rendered them unfit. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down a federal statute that provided dependent benefits for all spouses
of male service members, but provided the same benefits to the spouses of female service members
only upon their showing of actual dependence on their wives for over one-half of their support,
because it was based on an assumption that women do not support their husbands); Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1971) (striking down an employer’s no-marriage rule,
which applied only to female flight personnel, because it was based on sex stereotypes about
women’s domestic role). In Price Waterhouse, by contrast, the Court took aim at prescriptive sex
stereotyping, whereby a woman was penalized because she did not, in fact, possess the traits and
attributes expected of her sex. For a more extensive discussion of different types of sex stereotyping,
see infra Part I. See also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36-41 (1995) (explaining
that the stereotyping “that applied to Hopkins was prescriptive—it centered on how she ought to
behave”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2010) (“Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer insists that an
individual possess or exhibit certain traits and attributes because of her group membership.”).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 21-43.
5 Transsexualism was first listed as a condition in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders published in 1980. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-64 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
The DSM-III identified the features of transsexualism as “a persistent sense of discomfort and
inappropriateness about one’s anatomic sex” accompanied by a “persistent wish to be rid of one’s
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from being outside antidiscrimination protection altogether,6 to being at the
forefront of courts’ evolving and expanding interpretation of federal sex
discrimination law.7
Astonishingly, the precise contours, dimensions, and requirements of
the sex stereotyping prohibition have never been articulated clearly either
by courts or by scholars. Courts tend simply to restate the language of Price
Waterhouse as though its meaning were self-evident.8 Scholars most often
genitals and to live as a member of the other sex.” Id. at 261-62. The fourth edition of the DSM,
published in 2000, replaced the term “transsexualism” with “Gender Identity Disorder (GID),” but
the basic diagnostic criteria remained the same. A diagnosis of GID required “strong and
persistent cross-gender identification” and “persistent discomfort” about one’s assigned sex or a
“sense of inappropriateness in the gender role.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532, 537-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSMIV]. The revised edition of the DSM-IV, the DSM-IV-TR, published in 2004, retained the same
diagnostic criteria. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 576, 581 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. For an explanation
of how the term “transsexual” differs from the term “transgender,” see Anna Kirkland, Victorious
Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2
(2003) (“[T]he term transsexual . . . refer[s] to people who identify as such and who seek to alter
their physiological gender status through surgery or hormones in order to bring it into line with
their social and emotional gender status. The term transgendered . . . captures a broader category
of gender variant people who have not necessarily sought to alter their bodies but nonetheless feel
a disjunction between their biologically and socially gendered selves.” (emphasis omitted)).
6 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (determining that
Title VII’s legislative history indicates that it does not protect transsexuals); Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“Because Congress has not shown an
intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one’s transexualism does
not fall within the protective purview of [Title VII].”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977), (refusing to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals because
“Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ [in Title VII] to its
traditional meaning”).
7 See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Price
Waterhouse extends Title VII protection to sex-stereotyped transsexuals); Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is transsexual . . . is no
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sexstereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”).
8 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(explaining that after Price Waterhouse, “in establishing that ‘gender played a motivating part in an
employment decision’, a plaintiff in a Title VII case may introduce evidence that the employment
decision was made in part because of a sex stereotype” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989))); Barnes, 401 F.3d at 741 (explaining that “[a] claim for sex discrimination
under Title VII . . . can properly lie where the claim is based on ‘sexual stereotypes’”); Smith, 378
F.3d at 571 (explaining that Price Waterhouse “held that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ bars gender discrimination, including discrimination based on sex stereotypes”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust
as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other
men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”
(citation omitted)); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme
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presume what the prohibition should mean,9 sometimes then chastising
courts for their failure to apply the prohibition “correctly.”10
In this paper, I take a position of greater deference to the judiciary with
the aim of achieving greater clarity. By looking at recent case law invoking
or ignoring the Supreme Court’s admonition of sex stereotyping, I seek to
uncover the demands—and limits—of the prohibition as it is actually being
applied, rather than as it should be applied in some normatively ideal
jurisprudential universe. After defining the prohibition, I explore its likely
implications for antidiscrimination law, workplace freedom, and social
conceptions of gender.
I begin in Part I with an introduction to the sex stereotyping prohibition
announced in Price Waterhouse and its more recent jurisprudential progeny.
In Parts II and III, I consider the interpretations of the prohibition most
often offered by scholars—namely that the prohibition requires either
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins makes clear that Title VII does not permit an
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to
stereotypical gender roles.” (citation omitted)), vacated, 532 U.S. 1001 (1998).
A few courts have, however, noted the ambiguity of the prohibition. Indeed, when Price Waterhouse came before the D.C. Circuit, Judge Williams dissented from the majority’s holding that the
employer had engaged in prohibited sex stereotyping on the grounds that “[t]he majority
implicitly adopts a novel theory of liability under Title VII, but neither confronts the novelty of
the theory nor gives it any intelligible bounds.” Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See also Schroer v.
Billington (Schroer I), 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2006) (identifying the lack of
consensus among lower courts on the meaning of the “Price Waterhouse approach to sex stereotyping,”
and explaining that the prohibition was actually “considerably more narrow than its sweeping
language suggests”).
9 See, e.g., Case, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining that the sex stereotyping prohibition stated in
Price Waterhouse protected individuals from being “penalized because their gender behavior did
not conform to stereotypical expectations”); Andrew Gilden, Toward A More Transformative
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 92
(2008) (“Under [the sex stereotyping] theory it is impermissible for an employer to discriminate
against an employee for failure to conform to the stereotypes attached to his or her biological
sex.”); Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law’s Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 62 (2003) (explaining that after Price Waterhouse, “[d]iscrimination
because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII”
(quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000))); Franklin H. Romeo,
Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 740 (2005) (“Sex-stereotyping claims allege discrimination on the basis of
a person's failure to conform to the expected behavior of their sex.”).
10 See, e.g., Case, supra note 2, at 4 (“[S]hocking though it may be to some sensibilities, not
only masculine women such as Hopkins, but also effeminate men, indeed even men in dresses,
should already unequivocally be protected under existing law from discrimination on the basis of
gender-role-transgressive behavior.”); Romeo, supra note 9, at 740-41 (“While the reasoning
inherent in Hopkins would appear to cover discrimination against a wide spectrum of gender
nonconforming people[,] . . . [c]ourts seemingly went out of their way to exclude transgender
litigants from succeeding under claims of sex discrimination on these grounds.”).
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gender libertarianism or trait neutrality. According to the genderlibertarianism view, the sex stereotyping prohibition guarantees full freedom
of gender expression in the workplace. According to the trait-neutrality
view, the sex stereotyping prohibition requires that employees be permitted
to adopt whatever gendered traits are permitted of the other sex. Both
interpretations suggest the transformative potential of the prohibition;
neither, I argue, is plausible. In Part IV, I consider whether the prohibition
demands instead a narrower commitment to category neutrality whereby
employers may require gender code compliance, but must remain neutral as
to which gender code employees adopt. In Part V, I consider whether the
sex stereotyping prohibition is best understood as a pragmatic burdenshifting framework rather than as a distinct antidiscrimination principle. I
argue that the burden-shifting framework—in which conformity demands
viewed as highly costly by the court trigger a presumption of protection that
the employer then bears the burden of overcoming—provides the most
coherent and comprehensive account of the sex stereotyping prohibition at
work. Finally, in Part VI, I examine the implications of the prohibition in
light of Title VII’s broad antidiscrimination goals. Title VII operates on
both an individual and a group level.11 Individuals are to be evaluated on
their own merits rather than on their group membership.12 Traditional
group hierarchies are to be dismantled, in part, by challenging the norms,
stereotypes, and prejudices that justify and legitimize them.13 In practice,
the sex stereotyping prohibition encourages plaintiffs to endorse and adopt
highly stereotyped gender packages in order to convince courts of the steep
costs associated with their forced gender expression. The implications of the
11 See, e.g., John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
423, 474 (2002) (explaining that “[a]s clear as it is that the [Civil Rights] Act was intended as an
anti-differentiation principle, it is equally clear that the purpose of the Act was to improve the
economic condition” of protected groups).
12 See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey) (“Title VII is
designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion.”).
13 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group . . . .”); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
(“It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’
impressions about the characteristics of males or females.” (citation omitted)); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (noting that “the federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes”); see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”).
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prohibition are both dangerous and ironic in ways that scholars have not
previously recognized. While the prohibition has extended Title VII’s
protection to workers who had previously been excluded, it has done so by
relying on and reinforcing traditional gender categories. By doing so,
moreover, the prohibition actually protects some individuals at the expense
of the class whose subordination (stemming from socially salient gender
norms) remains intact.
I. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ITS PROGENY
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins involved a woman who was denied admittance to the partnership at Price Waterhouse because she was deemed
insufficiently feminine.14 Indeed, the partner who was responsible for
informing her of the firm’s decision to put her candidacy on hold advised
her that in order to improve her chances the following year, Hopkins should
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”15
There is language in the case suggesting that what the Court found
problematic about the employer’s femininity demands was that they placed
Hopkins in a double-bind.16 Hopkins was required to be feminine, while the
successful performance of her job required her to adopt more traditionally
masculine traits and behaviors. As the Court explained, given the demands
placed on her, Hopkins would be out of a job if she behaved aggressively,
and out of a job if she did not.17

14
15

490 U.S. at 235.
Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (1985) (quotation marks
omitted)).
16 For similar readings, see Case, supra note 2, at 45, 60 (noting that “[t]he Hopkins plurality
seems . . . . to have placed a great deal of weight on the doubleness of Hopkins's bind . . . . This
raises the intriguing question of what would have happened had the double bind been dissolved.”).
See also Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (“In our case,
Dillon’s supposed activities or characteristics simply had no relevance to the workplace, and did
not place him in a ‘Catch-22.’ Thus, the discussion of sexual stereotyping in Price Waterhouse does
not support a holding that discrimination ‘on account of sex’ was involved in this case.”); Schroer I,
424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.D.C. 2006) (surmising that what was problematic in Price Waterhouse
was that the sex stereotyping at play “had created an intolerable ‘Catch-22’ for its female
employees” (citation omitted)).
17 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (1989) (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind.”).
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Yet the Court’s rhetoric extended well beyond double-binds. Indeed, the
Court declared all sex stereotyping to be a prohibited form of sex discrimination. It explained:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”18

The Court’s prohibition actually encompassed two distinct types of sex
stereotyping—ascriptive stereotyping and prescriptive stereotyping.
Ascriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer assumes that an individual
possesses certain traits and attributes because of her sex that render her
unqualified for a particular position. This is the most traditional form of sex
stereotyping, and was the Court’s initial target.19 Prescriptive stereotyping
occurs when an employer insists that an individual possess or exhibit certain
traits and attributes because of her group membership. Price Waterhouse
involves prescriptive stereotyping.20 It was the Court’s novel and broad
18
19

Id. at 251 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Yuracko, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that “[a]scriptive sex stereotyping had been illegal
well before Price Waterhouse”). Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. serves as an example of ascriptive
stereotyping. See 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that an employer could not refuse to
hire female, but not male, employees with young children based on the assumption that such
workers would have heavy child care responsibilities).
20 See J. Cindy Eson, In Praise of Macho Women: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 835, 851 (1992) (suggesting that the evaluation of Hopkins’s interpersonal skills drew on
essentialized notions of gender as evidenced by her “deviation from the feminine stereotype,” and
“the exaggerated perception of her ‘aggressive’ behavior by her male peers”); Joel Wm. Friedman,
Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 211 (2007) (“Under what is now referred to as the sex-stereotyping
principle, the [Price Waterhouse] Court declared that a plaintiff could demonstrate that she had
been the victim of sex-based discrimination by establishing that the employer’s challenged action
had been triggered by her failure to conform to its sex-stereotyped expectations.”); Jonathan A.
Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. and the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit “Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 193, 202 (2002)
(“[I]n Price Waterhouse, a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed that
discrimination against an employee for failure to conform to gender stereotypes violates Title
VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of . . . sex.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Bonnie H. Schwartz, Case Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 57 U.S.L.W. 4469
(U.S. May 1, 1989) (No. 87-1167): Causation and Burdens of Proof in Title VII Mixed Motive Cases, 21
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 501, 539 (1989) (“Hopkins showed that stereotypes factored into the partnership
selection process and that her failure to conform to them substantially motivated Price Waterhouse’s
decision.”). Although far less common, it is possible to read Price Waterhouse itself as involving a
kind of ascriptive stereotyping. It may have been that the partners were so flustered when
Hopkins did not meet their expectations of proper femininity that they were unable to see that
she could in fact do the job.
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declaration against prescriptive sex stereotyping that set the stage for the
dramatic expansion of courts’ protection of gender nonconformists under
Title VII.
The first significant development came in the use of the prohibition to
protect men harassed because of their perceived effeminacy.21 In Doe v. City
of Belleville, for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the harassment of
two boys who were perceived by their male coworkers to be insufficiently
masculine constituted sex discrimination.22 In concluding that the boys had
presented evidence sufficient to show that they had been harassed because
of sex, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s anti-sex stereotyping language from Price Waterhouse.23 The court explained:
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his
hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in
a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and
behave, is harassed “because of” his sex.24

The Ninth Circuit provided similar protection to the plaintiff in Nichols
v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.25 Antonio Sanchez worked as a host and
then as a food server at Azteca restaurants in Washington State.26 During
his four-year employment with the restaurant chain, Sanchez was the target of a
steady stream of taunts and insults focusing on his perceived effeminacy.27
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez had
21 Cases involving harassment of women perceived as inappropriately masculine are less
frequent, but incorporated the sex stereotyping prohibition to similar effect. See, e.g., Heller v.
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1228-29 (D. Or. 2002) (denying the
employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence
such that a jury could find she had been harassed because she was deemed inappropriately
masculine in her traits and appearance).
22 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). Belleville involved the harassment of two teenage brothers working for the city as summer groundskeepers. Both brothers were
subject to taunts and abuse by their male coworkers, but one of the brothers, H. Doe, was the
“main target.” Id. at 567. The next year, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., that “same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.” 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998). The Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s Belleville opinion for further consideration in
light of that decision. 523 U.S. at 1001. Belleville settled before there was a decision on remand.
Oncale did not undermine Price Waterhouse’s gender-stereotyping logic, upon which the Belleville
Court relied in its decision. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2001) (finding that “there is nothing in Oncale . . . that would call into question” the holding in
Belleville that harassment based on a failure to live up to gender stereotypes is sex discrimination).
23 Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580-82.
24 Id. at 581.
25 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 Id. at 870.
27 Id.
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suffered actionable sex discrimination.28 “At its essence,” the court
explained, “the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that
Sanchez did not act as a man should act. . . . Price Waterhouse sets a rule that
bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes. That rule squarely
applies to preclude the harassment here.”29
More recent, and perhaps more dramatic, has been courts’ use of the
prohibition to protect transsexuals from discrimination, beginning with the
Sixth Circuit’s 2004 decision, Smith v. City of Salem.30 The court in Smith
relied on the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping prohibition from Price
Waterhouse to hold that a preoperative male-to-female transsexual had a
cause of action31 for sex discrimination based on allegations that she32 was
penalized for expressing feminine attributes at work.
Jimmie Smith worked as a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department in
Salem, Ohio.33 She was a biological male who had been diagnosed with
Gender Identity Disorder (GID). Shortly after Smith began expressing a
more feminine appearance at work, her coworkers started commenting on
her appearance and claiming that her mannerisms “were not ‘masculine
enough.’”34 After Smith told her supervisor about her GID and her intention
to transition from male to female, the Chief of the Fire Department held a

28 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the harassment was sufficiently severe to violate Title
VII, that it was because of sex, and that the employer was liable for the harassment for failing to
take adequate steps to stop it. Id. at 873, 874-75, 877-78.
29 Id. at 874-75. Several other circuits have endorsed similar protection in principle. See, e.g.,
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that
harassment aimed at punishing an employee for noncompliance with gender stereotypes is
actionable discrimination because of sex, but concluding that the plaintiff “did not claim that he
was harassed because he failed to comply with societal stereotypes of how men out to appear or
behave”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that discrimination
based on a failure to conform to sex stereotypes is actionable but holding that the plaintiff had
failed to plead sufficient facts for the court to consider whether he was harassed because of his
perceived effeminacy); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999) (explaining that “just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated
against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a
claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped
expectations of masculinity.” (citation omitted)). For an example of the protection courts have
offered to female workers harassed for their perceived masculinity, see Heller v. Columbia
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224, 1229 (D. Or. 2002).
30 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
31 Id. at 578.
32 In this and other cases involving transsexuals, I refer to the plaintiff using the plaintiff’s
chosen pronoun as opposed to the pronoun chosen by the court.
33 Id. at 568.
34 Id. Smith’s transition to a more feminine self-presentation was “in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID.” Id.
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meeting to find a basis for terminating her employment.35 Smith sued,
alleging that it was a form of sex discrimination to penalize her for her
failure to conform to masculine stereotypes.36 The Sixth Circuit agreed and
invoked the sex stereotyping prohibition to reverse the district court’s
dismissal of her claims.37 As the court explained, “[s]ex stereotyping based on
a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination,
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered
discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”38
One year later, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury finding of sex discrimination in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.39 Philecia Barnes was a preoperative
male-to-female transsexual who worked as a police officer in the Cincinnati
Police Department.40 She presented evidence at trial showing that she was
denied a promotion to the position of sergeant because she violated masculine
stereotypes.41 The jury ruled in Barnes’s favor on her sex discrimination
claim.42 Relying on its prior ruling in Smith for support, the court explained
that a jury could have reasonably concluded that Barnes was discriminated
against because of her failure to conform to masculine gender norms.43

35 The court noted that the Chief of the Fire Department and the Law Director of the City
of Salem “arranged a meeting of the City’s executive body to discuss Smith and devise a plan for
terminating his employment.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Smith was suspended for one twenty-four
hour shift due to an alleged infraction of department policy. Id. at 569.
36 Id. at 572 (“[Smith’s] complaint sets forth the conduct and mannerisms which, he alleges,
did not conform with his employers’ and co-workers’ sex stereotypes of how a man should look
and behave.”).
37 Id. (“Having alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man
should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently
pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.”).
38 Id. at 575.
39 401 F.3d 729, 747 (6th Cir. 2005).
40 Id. at 733.
41 For example, during her probationary period, Barnes was told by a supervisor that she was
not “sufficiently masculine.” Id. at 738.
42 Id. at 735.
43 Id. at 737-38. The Ninth Circuit has endorsed similar protection for transsexuals. See
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Gender Motivated
Violence Act parallels Title VII in prohibiting victimization of a transsexual because “the victim
was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one”); see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 325 F.
App’x. 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[a]fter Hopkins and Schwenk, it is unlawful to
discriminate against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in
accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women,” but, nonetheless, holding that an
employer’s ban on a transsexual plaintiff’s use of a women’s restroom for safety reasons did not
constitute sex discrimination).
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Several district courts in other circuits have recognized similar protections
for transsexual workers.44 In Creed v. Family Express Corp., the plaintiff, a
preoperative male-to-female transsexual, alleged that she was terminated
after she began presenting a more feminine appearance at work and rejected
her employer’s demand that she return to a more masculine appearance.45 In
assessing the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim and denying the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the court explicitly recognized sex stereotyping as the
basis for such a claim.46 The court noted that “Ms. Creed’s allegation she
was terminated after refusing to present herself in a masculine way permits
the inference she was terminated as a result of [her employer’s] stereotypical
perceptions, rather than simply her gender dysphoria.”47 As a result, the
court concluded, “Ms. Creed’s factual allegations supporting her claim she
was terminated because of her failure to comply with male stereotypes
support a plausible claim she suffered discrimination because of her sex.”48
44 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff had shown a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause based on sex stereotyping and noting that “[t]his Court concurs with the majority of courts
that have addressed this issue, finding that discrimination against a transgendered individual
because of their failure to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes discrimination on the basis of
sex”); Trevino v. Ctr. for Health Care Servs., No. 08-0140, 2008 WL 4449939, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2008) (determining that the plaintiff could state a claim for sex discrimination because
she alleged discrimination under Title VII based on gender, not transsexualism); Lopez v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining that
“Title VII is violated when an employer discriminates against any employee, transsexual or not,
because he or she has failed to act or appear sufficiently masculine or feminine enough for an
employer” (citation omitted)); see also Lie v. Sky Publ’g Corp., No. 013117, 2002 WL 31492397, at
*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (“The plaintiff [a preoperative male-to-female transsexual]
contends that the defendant’s conduct [requesting that the plaintiff wear only traditionally male
attire at work and subsequently firing the plaintiff upon her refusal] was based on stereotyped
notions of ‘appropriate’ male and female behavior in the same manner as the conduct of the
defendant in Price Waterhouse. Accordingly, the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of sex
discrimination . . . sufficient to survive summary judgment.”).
45 No. 06-465, 2007 WL 2265630, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007).
46 Id. at *3 (“[A] transgender plaintiff can state a sex stereotyping claim if the claim is that he
or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear masculine or feminine
enough for an employer, but such a claim must actually arise from the employee’s appearance or
conduct and the employer’s stereotypical perceptions.”).
47 Id. at *4. The court explained: “From Ms. Creed’s allegations in the complaint, it can . . .
reasonably be inferred that Family Express perceived Ms. Creed to be a man while she was
employed as a sales associate. That her managers requested she appear more masculine during
business hours allows the inference that the managers harbored certain stereotypical perceptions of
how men should dress.” Id.
48 Id. The court subsequently granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding
that the plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to show that she was terminated because of
her gender nonconformity, rather than her failure to satisfy the company’s sex-specific grooming
codes. Id. at *3. Certainly, real tension exists in the district court’s opinion. It is unclear how the
plaintiff, a transitioning male-to-female transsexual, could be protected from sex stereotypes while
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In Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., the court likewise relied on sex
stereotyping logic in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.49 The plaintiff, a preoperative male-tofemale transsexual, alleged that she was fired after she began to present as
female in public.50 The court explained that “[h]aving included facts
showing that [her] failure to conform to sex stereotypes of how a man
should look and behave was the catalyst behind defendant’s actions, plaintiff
has sufficiently pleaded claims of gender discrimination.”51
More recently in Schroer v. Billington, the District Court for the District
of Columbia held that the Library of Congress had engaged in sex discrimination by revoking its job offer to the plaintiff because she failed to satisfy
stereotypes of what a woman should look like.52 The plaintiff, a male-tofemale transsexual, applied for and was offered a job as a terrorism specialist

being punished for failing to satisfy her employer’s grooming code for men. As this tension
suggests, the courts’ prohibition on sex stereotyping is complicated and nuanced in ways the courts
themselves have not yet explicitly articulated.
49 No. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006).
50 Id. at *1.
51 Id. at *2.
52 (Schroer III), 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305-06 (D.D.C. 2008). Although the court ultimately
relied on the sex stereotyping theory in ruling for the plaintiff, it struggled with the ambiguity of
that theory in responding to the defendant’s first motion to dismiss. The court noted the judicial
confusion surrounding the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping language in Price Waterhouse and
explained that the prohibition was actually “considerably more narrow than [the opinion’s]
sweeping language suggests.” Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling on the
defendant’s first motion to dismiss). The court noted that cases involving discrimination based on
sexual orientation and those involving sex-based dress codes “partake in some measure of sex
stereotyping, and yet the courts deciding them . . . have not clearly articulated what, if anything,
distinguishes any of the cases from Price Waterhouse.” Id. What was problematic in Price Waterhouse,
the Schroer court surmised, was that the sex stereotyping at play “had created an intolerable
‘Catch-22’ for its female employees.” Id. Indeed, in ruling on the defendant’s first motion to
dismiss, the court concluded that Schroer had not stated a sex stereotyping claim of sex discrimination because Schroer was not being penalized for failing to satisfy conventional gender stereotypes, but rather for seeking “to express her female identity . . . as a woman. . . . The problem she
faces is not because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men and women
should look and behave—she adopts those norms.” Id. at 211. Nonetheless, the court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Title VII should be understood to prohibit
antitranssexual animus in addition to sex stereotyping. Id. at 212-13. After the court’s initial ruling,
Schroer amended her complaint to allege that her “non-selection resulted from [her supervisor’s]
reaction on seeing photographs of Schroer in women’s clothing—specifically, that [the supervisor]
believed that Schroer looked ‘like a man in women’s clothing rather than what she believed a
woman should look like.’” Schroer v. Billington (Schroer II), 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2007)
(ruling on the defendant’s second motion to dismiss). The amended complaint, the court
concluded, did state a sex stereotyping claim because “Schroer now asserts that she was discriminated
against because, when presenting herself as a woman, she did not conform to [her supervisor’s] sex
stereotypical notions about women’s appearance and behavior.” Id. at 63.
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with the Library of Congress while presenting herself as a man.53 Before
beginning work, Schroer notified her new supervisor that she would begin
work as a woman and showed her three photographs of herself dressed as a
woman.54 Shortly thereafter, the supervisor withdrew the offer, admitting at
trial that “when she viewed the photographs of Schroer in traditionally
feminine attire . . . she saw a man in women’s clothing.”55 According to the
court, this admission provided direct evidence that the Library’s decision
“was infected by sex stereotypes.”56
Neither the effeminate men nor the transsexual discrimination cases
involve double-binds like the one at issue in Price Waterhouse. These are not
cases in which the demands of masculinity conflict with actual job requirements. To the contrary, in cases like Smith and Barnes, masculine gender
performances were likely to complement and even enhance job performance. There must then be a broader conception of the sex stereotyping
prohibition at work in these cases.
II. LIBERTARIANISM
The broadest reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is that it is a
demand for gender libertarianism in the workplace. Freedom from sex
stereotypes, under this view, means freedom for workers from all forced
gender conduct. All gender expressions—those that are group-identified as
well as those that are idiosyncratic; those that are innate and fixed as well as
those that are chosen and changing—are entitled to protection.
Pointing to the expansiveness of courts’ stereotyping rhetoric, several
scholars have adopted this broad reading of the prohibition. Thomas Ling,
for example, asserts that Smith guarantees to all individuals the right “to
53
54
55
56

Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06.
Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
Id. at 305.
Id. The Schroer III court found sex discrimination based both on its conclusion that the
employer had engaged in sex stereotyping and because it concluded that that discrimination
against a worker because of his plan to change his anatomical sex was “literally discrimination
‘because of . . . sex.’” Id. at 308. The court explained:
Ultimately, I do not think that it matters for purposes of Title VII liability whether
the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be an
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently
gender-nonconforming transsexual . . . . While I would therefore conclude that
Schroer is entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type claim for sex stereotyping, I also conclude that she is entitled to judgment based on the language of the
statute itself.
Id. at 305-06.
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control their own gender expression.”57 Similarly, Johnny Lo contends that
the Smith decision “preserve[s] liberty of self-identity in our 21st Century
world.”58
As a statement of current legal reality, such a reading of the prohibition
is clearly fanciful. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court saw no problem
with the masculine job demands placed on prospective partners. As Mary
Anne Case has noted, “there is little indication . . . that the Court would
have found it to be sex discrimination if a prospective accounting partner
had instead been told to remove her makeup and jewelry and to go to assertiveness training class instead of charm school.”59 Highly gendered workplace
performances continue to be demanded in a wide range of jobs—think, for
example, of the kind of gender performance typically required of elementary
school teachers and litigators. Courts have done nothing to protect workers
from such demands.60 Even more starkly antilibertarian is courts’ enforcement of employers’ sex-based grooming codes. Consider, for example, the
Ninth Circuit’s enforcement in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. of a
requirement that female, but not male, bartenders wear makeup at work.61
Yet even as a normative ideal, the libertarian reading of the prohibition
is impractical and unappealing. At its most expansive, gender libertarianism
requires protection for all forms of gender expression—those that are
stereotypical, atypical, and idiosyncratic; those that are persistent; and those

57 Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 285 (2005).
58 Johnny Lo, Case Note, Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), 11
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 277, 282 (2005). For additional expressions of this view
see Amanda Raflo, Comment, Evolving Protections for Transgender Employees Under Title VII’s Sex
Discrimination Prohibition: A New Era Where Gender is More Than Chromosomes, 2 CHARLOTTE L.
REV. 217, 248 (2010) (stating that, after Smith, “it seems clear, or should be clear, that a
transgender plaintiff would be protected under Title VII for failing to conform to traditional
gender stereotypes of men and women under a Price Waterhouse theory”); William C. Sung, Note,
Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes,
Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 537 (2011) (explaining that, after
Smith, “discrimination or harassment based on . . . gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible
irrespective of the cause of the behavior, whether it be gender expression or affectional preferences”); and Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title
VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (2007) (arguing that under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping
theory “[d]iscrimination against someone for being transgender is discrimination based on that
person’s non-conformity with gender stereotypes. This is true whether the individual is viewed by
the employer or the court as a man who is insufficiently masculine, a woman who is insufficiently
feminine, or someone who falls in between those seemingly binary categories”).
59 Case, supra note 2, at 3.
60 See generally Yuracko, supra note 2, at 15-16 (citing cases where courts deemed reasonable
employers’ gender-normative workplace demands).
61 444 F.3d 1104, 1107-08, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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that are transient. Under this view, gender becomes whatever people say it
is. As gender becomes solely a matter of self-identification, the distinction
between gender and personal idiosyncrasy becomes one of mere nominalism,
and all conduct becomes potentially entitled to protection.
Title VII, however, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and
gender,62 not discrimination based on a whole host of other traits and
attributes.63 This distinction, to be meaningful, requires a definition of
gender more stable than simple self-declaration. Yet, once gender is defined
using external or objective criteria, there will be some forms of expression
experienced by the actor as gender expressions that do not satisfy the
category requirements.64 Protection for gender expressions will necessarily
be limited to a proscribed set and some forms of “gender” expression will be
defined out of the box. In particular, idiosyncratic or impermanent gender
expressions are unlikely to be recognized and protected. Herein lies the core
tension within the libertarian interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition on sex
stereotyping: complete gender freedom is incompatible with any kind of
stable and workable definition of gender, but Title VII requires such a
definition.
62 See Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004) (asserting that Price Waterhouse “held that Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ bars gender discrimination”).
63 See 110 CONG. REC. 7212-13 (1964) (interpretive memorandum of Title VII submitted by
Sens. Clark and Case) (“To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment
or favor and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited . . . are
based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other
criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title.”); see also Hill v. St. Louis
Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[The ADEA and Title VII] serve the narrow purpose of
prohibiting discrimination based on certain, discreet classifications such as age, gender, or race.
These statutes do not prohibit employment decisions based upon poor job performance, erroneous
evaluations, personal conflicts between employees, or even unsound business practices.”).
64 External criteria for identifying gender expressions are necessary. Two seem most plausible. Gender expressions might be defined by and limited to “standard” performances of
masculinity or femininity. Gender would, in other words, be defined by those expressions that are
socially group-identified. Alternatively, gender expressions might be limited to those that are
deemed integral to one’s gender identity as determined not by self-proclamation but by an
external judge or expert. Scholars have argued for versions of both approaches to identity in the race
context. See, e.g., Juan F Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 833 (1994) (calling for revision of Title VII to make
unlawful discrimination based on ethnicity, meaning “physical and cultural characteristics that
make a social group distinctive, either in group members’ eyes or in the view of outsiders”); Gowri
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup,
Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 19 (2006) (“[P]ersonal appearance choices play a unique
and crucial role in the development and revision of a simultaneously public and personal
identity . . . [and the] law can create a zone in which to better empower individuals to form and
reform identity, promoting a dynamic, rather than static, culture and society.”).
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To make this tension more vivid, consider the following. Imagine that
instead of objecting to a requirement that she wear makeup at work,
Darlene Jespersen objected to a requirement that she smile at customers.
She objected not on the grounds that smiling violated her gender identity,
but on the grounds that smiling inauthentically at strangers violated her
self-image and sense of self.
Jespersen’s challenge to the smile-at-customers rule would clearly fail
under Title VII. Title VII does not provide blanket protection for personal
expression, even for those forms of personal expression that are consistent
with technical job requirements. Title VII is not a just-cause requirement; it
does not protect against job-irrational treatment65—it only protects against
treatment based on protected characteristics.66
Imagine next that Jespersen objected to the smile-at-customers rule on
the grounds that it violated her gender identity. Smiling at strangers,
Jespersen might argue, is a particularly feminine attribute signaling deference
and servility. It is in conflict with her more masculine and assertive gender
identity.
Under a libertarian interpretation of the sex stereotyping prohibition,
Jespersen’s refusal to smile would now be protected under Title VII. So too,
of course, would be any attribute that Jespersen labeled or identified as an
expression of her gender.
Without guidelines for what differentiates an expression of gender from
an expression of personal taste, Title VII would be left without form,
predictability, or limit. With gender guidelines in place, however, plaintiffs
like my second hypothetical Jespersen will likely find their idiosyncratic
expressions of gender unprotected. It is impossible to structure protection
in a way that both relies on the category of gender and simultaneously
transcends any conventional understanding of it.
True gender libertarianism would also impose dramatic costs and constraints on both employers and society more generally. The most conventional justification for Title VII’s prohibition on race and sex discrimination
is that these are job-irrelevant hiring criteria.67 Race and sex per se are not
relevant to (though they may be highly correlated with) whether one

65 By “job-irrational,” I mean treatment that is not based on one’s ability or inability to do a
particular job. An employer’s decision to refuse to hire anyone who shows up to an interview
wearing green would, for example, be job-irrational and would not be prohibited by Title VII.
66 See supra note 63.
67 For a discussion of different definitions of the “antidiscrimination norm,” see Mark Kelman,
Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006).
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possesses the range of skills and attributes necessary for (almost all) jobs.68
Such is not the case with gender. Many jobs are distinctly gendered. That
is, they demand a set of traits and attributes that are typically recognized as
masculine or feminine. Prohibiting employers from requiring conduct that
is traditionally gendered would force employers to restructure jobs so as to
fit employees’ preferred gender expressions—such accommodations would
be costly and, in some cases, impossible.
Consider, for example, three jobs with traditionally feminine role
demands—flight attendant, elementary school teacher, and paralegal. Flight
attendants are (or at least were prior to 9/11) expected by employers to be
warm, friendly, helpful, and at least somewhat deferential to customers.69
Elementary school teachers are expected to be nurturing, empathetic, and
sensitive to children’s needs.70 They are also expected to be collegial and
cooperative in their dealings with other teachers and administrators.71
Paralegals are expected to be organized and analytical. They are also
expected to be deferential toward and emotionally supportive of the lawyers
with whom they work.72
These jobs differ significantly from those with traditionally masculine
role demands such as litigation associate, debt collector, and Marine.
Litigation lawyers are “expected to be tough, aggressive, and intimidating”
toward their opponents.73 Debt collectors are expected, indeed encouraged,

68 For instances in which sex is job-relevant, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and
Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004).
69 See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING 8 (1983) (“For the flight attendant, the smiles are a part of her work . . . .”);
JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS
52 (1995) (“[F]light attendants’ friendliness takes the form of deference: their relationship to
passengers is supportive and subordinate.”).
70 See JIM ALLAN, Male Elementary Teachers: Experiences and Perspectives, in DOING
“WOMEN’S WORK”: MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 113, 123-26 (Christine L. William
ed., 1993) (“For even as [male elementary teachers interviewed in the author’s study] were
expected to be male role models, they were simultaneously stereotyped as feminine—because of
the kind of work they do.”).
71 See id. at 119 (“Since teaching on the elementary level requires a high degree of flexibility,
collegiality, and cooperation, men who don’t ‘prove themselves,’ or don’t ‘get along,’ don’t get
rehired.”).
72 See Pierce, supra note 69, at 86 (describing the “emotional labor” paralegals undertake in
supporting the attorneys with whom they work and characterizing such labor as “feminized”).
73 Id. at 2. As Pierce describes, the lawyers in her study “boast about ‘destroying witnesses,’
‘playing hard-ball,’ and ‘taking no prisoners’ and about the size and amount of their ‘win.’” Id. at 60.
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to be aggressive and intimidating toward debtors.74 Marines are celebrated
for their “strength, aggressiveness, [and] emotional detachment.”75
Certainly, some jobs seem gendered for no reason other than social
convention. The role of secretary, for example, came to include both
caretaking and sexual titillation only after the job became dominated by
women.76 Such expectations were not part of the job when it was performed
predominantly by men. As women came to dominate the profession, its
norms changed so as to essentially preclude further male occupation.77
Other jobs seem gendered for reasons more intrinsic to the job itself.
Nurturing treatment, for example, probably is important to the healthy
development of young children. A nurturing disposition may then be
required of elementary school teachers for reasons independent of the fact
that most elementary school teachers are female.78 The same may hold true
of the role demands for Marines. The core functions of a Marine may simply
be performed better by one who is physically strong, aggressive, and unemotional. Men may dominate the Marines because they have these qualities to a
higher degree than women, but the role demands themselves may be defined
this way for reasons independent of men’s past or present dominance.
Jobs may be gendered not only in terms of the attributes they seek, but
also, in terms of the clothes and appearance they require. Construction and
other forms of physical labor, for example, often require not just a kind of

74 See Hochschild, supra note 69, at 1146 (describing that “open aggression was the official
policy for wringing money out of debtors”).
75 See CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN
IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 1 (1989).
76 See Rosemary Pringle, Male Secretaries, in DOING “WOMEN’S WORK”, supra note 70, at
128, 132-33 (Christine L. Williams ed., 1993) (noting the emergence of a “sexual dynamic” in the
relationship between secretaries and their bosses that “largely exclude[s] men from being defined
as secretaries”); see also ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION
70 (1977) (“The secretarial job involved the most routine of tasks in the white-collar world, yet the
most personal of relationships.”).
77 Such preclusion was primarily by gender, the requirement of feminine deference weeding
out the more traditionally masculine—and only to a lesser degree by sex, to the extent that sexual
titillation was also being demanded.
78 It certainly may be that the gendered aspects of the role are reaction qualifications rather
than technical qualifications. See Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS
99, 100 (1983) (explaining that “[r]eaction qualifications refer to those abilities or characteristics
which contribute to job effectiveness by causing or serving as the basis of the appropriate reaction
in the recipients. Technical qualifications refer to all other qualifications (of an ordinary sort)”). It
may be, in other words, that being soft of voice and touch is important for elementary school
teachers only because of the positive response such treatment elicits from young subjects. Yet for
teachers of young children, being able to elicit happy and positive student reactions may be the
most important qualification for the job.
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masculine strength, but also the adoption of masculine dress and grooming
styles in order for these jobs to be performed safely.
An employer who is unable to force a femininely gendered construction
worker to tie her hair back and wear pants to work will be unable to safely
assign the worker to a range of duties. An employer who is unable to force a
femininely gendered bill collector to scowl and talk in an aggressive manner
may have to pair the feminine worker with a more masculine coworker, in a
good-cop/bad-cop kind of ploy, in order for the worker to be effective. An
employer who cannot force a masculinely gendered elementary school
worker to smile and coo at his charges may not be able to create the kind of
warm and nurturing atmosphere in which children thrive. In all cases, the
costs to employers, and society more generally, of true gender libertarianism
for workers would be significant.
Perhaps, however, there is a narrower libertarian principle at work in
courts’ sex stereotyping jurisprudence. It may be that although not all
gender expressions are protected, those gender expressions that are
consistent with technical job requirements are entitled to protection. This
narrower libertarian reading would lessen the costs imposed on employers
by the broader principle, since employers would not be required to hire
individuals whose gender expressions were incompatible with successful job
performance. It would continue, however, to suffer from ambiguity about
what constitutes an expression of “gender.”
Although theoretically distinct, this narrower libertarian reading would
be similar in its scope to a reading of the prohibition as requiring trait
neutrality from employers. Under a trait-neutrality reading, an employer
must permit female employees to express their gender in any ways permitted
of male employees and vice versa. Presumably, all gender expressions an
employer permits of either sex are compatible with job performance,
otherwise the employer would not permit them for anyone. The narrow
libertarian reading would, therefore, protect all gender expressions protected
by the trait-neutrality reading, and potentially more.79 It follows that if the
trait-neutrality reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is implausibly
expansive, then the narrow libertarian principle is implausible as well.

79 The narrow libertarian principle could be broader than the trait-neutrality principle in
instances where an employer rigidly restricts the gender expressions of both sexes such that there
are some job-irrelevant gender expressions that would be protected under the narrow libertarian
principle but that would not be protected under the trait-neutrality principle if consistently
prohibited for both sexes by the employer.
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III. TRAIT NEUTRALITY
Under a trait-neutrality reading, the prohibition on sex stereotyping
requires employers to be indifferent to whether gendered traits are adopted
by women or by men. As a result, any gendered expression permitted of
women must be permitted of men, and vice versa.
Both before and after the recent transsexual victories, trait neutrality
has been a popular interpretation of the prohibition on sex stereotyping.80
Mary Anne Case has endorsed this reading most clearly, explaining that
under Price Waterhouse “[i]f their employer tolerates feminine behavior or
attire in women but not in [men], the employer is subjecting them to
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.”81 Indeed, trait neutrality
simply restates a conventional understanding of the sex discrimination
prohibition that has been used in a range of contexts.82 It is a reading that
extends beyond situations involving sex stereotypes and does not rely on
them.
Yet in a world of richly textured gender norms, demands of trait neutrality are more complex and indeterminate than often recognized. Gender
norms give traits socially loaded meanings and these meanings make finding
cross-sex comparators difficult if not impossible.
Imagine, for example, a female librarian terminated from her job at a
university library who claims that she was terminated because her employer
found her manner of dress too “sexy.”83 She sues for sex discrimination
arguing that she was the victim of a sex stereotype that deems women, but
not men, who present themselves in a sexy manner to be professionally
80 See Ling, supra note 57, at 285 (“Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows both sexes to
participate in the full range of gender expressions.”); Turner, supra note 58, at 590 (interpreting
Smith to mean that “discrimination against a person for acting ‘like’ the other sex—no matter what
the reason—is sex discrimination”).
81 Case, supra note 2, at 7; see also Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and Equal
Rights Advocates as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Lucas Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust
Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 99-2309), reprinted in 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 170
(2001) (interpreting the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping prohibition to mean that “for a man to
be denied access to credit on the basis of traits that would have been welcome if found in a woman
is sex discrimination, plain and simple”).
82 Andrew Koppelman, for example, has argued that discrimination because of sexual orientation is sex discrimination because it penalizes women for doing something that men are permitted
to do (namely partnering with women) and vice versa. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 53-71 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197
(1994); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,
98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
83 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Harvard Univ., No. 03-11797, 2005 WL 2148515 (D. Mass. Apr. 5,
2005); Harvard Librarian Sues University, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A13.
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incompetent and unintellectual.84 To determine whether the employer is in
fact violating the principle of trait neutrality, a court would need to compare
the employer’s treatment of the plaintiff with its treatment of a man
engaged in similarly gendered conduct. What is unclear, however, is what
constitutes similarly gendered conduct in a man.
There is no exact male equivalent to the female trait of “sexy dressing.”
One could identify the trait at issue in a narrow and literal way. The trait
might be described as wearing particular types of clothes—for instance, lowcut blouses and tight skirts. By naming the trait in this way, the woman is
the victim of discrimination if she is treated worse than a man who wore the
same types of blouses and skirts to work. Framing the issue in this way,
however, is unlikely to result in a finding of sex discrimination because of
the likely absence of a cross-sex comparator.85 Yet even if such a comparator
could be found, it is far from clear that this narrowly literalistic framing of
the cross-sex comparison is appropriate. A man dressed in a low-cut blouse
and tight skirt might be objectionable to the employer, but it is probably
not because he is sexy.
Alternatively, one could compare the woman’s treatment to that of a man
dressed in sex-specific sexy clothing. Of course, deciding what constitutes
sexy dressing for men is not obvious and probably open to disagreement.86
Is the parallel to the sexy dressing woman in revealing skirts and blouses a
man in revealing open-chested shirts and tight pants? Or, because of the
significantly different social and symbolic meanings of women and men in
revealing clothing, are tight and revealing clothes considered sexy in women
but strange and nonsexy in men such that this too may not be an appropriate
comparison?
Finally, one could compare the employer’s treatment of women who
dress in a sexy manner with its treatment of men who violate appropriate
workplace norms. At this level of abstraction, however, the neutrality
demand becomes toothless and unable to challenge employers’ endorsement
of any gender stereotypes.

84

See Peter Glick et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- and High-Status Jobs, 29 PSYCHOL.
that female managers who presented themselves in a sexier
manner elicited “perceptions of less competence on a subjective rating scale and less intelligence on
an objective scale” as compared with female managers who dressed more conservatively).
85 For an outstanding discussion of the difficulties in finding comparators in antidiscrimination cases and a critique of courts’ reliance on comparator methodology, see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
86 I suspect there is significantly less social consensus regarding what constitutes sexy dressing
for men than there is about what constitutes sexy dressing for women.
OF WOMEN Q. 389, 394 (2005) (finding
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The indeterminacy problem is particularly apparent in cases involving
transsexuals. Imagine a preoperative male-to-female transsexual who is
terminated for wearing skirts and feminine blouses to work. Is the appropriate comparator for purposes of trait-neutrality analysis a woman wearing
conventionally feminine clothes? Or, is the preoperative male-to-female
transsexual better compared to a woman wearing conventionally male
clothes, or to a female-to-male transsexual wearing male clothes?87 Gender
norms complicate cross-sex comparisons and make trait-neutrality demands
virtually impossible to operationalize.
For the trait-neutrality requirement to be workable, gender norms must
be ignored or rejected. Trait neutrality must be defined in a literal and
formalistic way without regard to the actual social meaning of the traits and
attributes at issue. To use Mary Anne Case’s colorful example, if women are
free to wear “frilly pink dresses” at work, then men must be permitted to do
so as well,88 despite the fact that a frilly pink dress signals conservatism in a
woman and transgression in a man. For advocates of trait neutrality, such
rejection or transcendence of gender norms may seem not only appealing,
but the very point of the prohibition on sex stereotyping.
Yet rejecting gender norms is costly. Gender norms are not only pervasive, they are also, often, comfortable and comforting. Formal trait neutrality
would require that if female employees are permitted to wear dresses, long
hair, and makeup, male employees must be permitted to do so as well.
Certainly, some employers might follow this approach, thereby expanding
the range of permissible traits and attributes open to employees of both
sexes. For other employers, or their customers, the discomfort of such
gender bending would be too great. For them, compliance might instead
take the form of highly circumscribed gender codes confined to a banal
androgynous core. Discomfort with gender bending would be minimized, but

87 Several courts have struggled with the problem of appropriate cross-sex comparators in
transsexual discrimination cases. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 WL
31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (“[T]his is not a situation where the plaintiff failed to
conform to a gender stereotype. Plaintiff was not discharged because he did not act sufficiently
masculine or because he exhibited traits normally valued in a female employee, but disparaged in a
male employee. . . . The plaintiff was terminated because he is a man with a sexual or gender
identity disorder who, in order to publicly disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing,
shoes, underwear, breast prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends to be a woman, and
publicly identifies himself as a woman named ‘Donna.’”); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, 881 F.
Supp. 478, 481 n.4 (D. Kan. 1995) (explaining that in order to evaluate a plaintiff’s sex discrimination
claim, the court would have to compare the treatment of the plaintiff as a male-to-female
transsexual with the treatment of a female-to-male transsexual).
88 Case, supra note 2, at 7.
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at the cost of a loss of freedom for gender conformists and nonconformists
alike.89
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts have not interpreted the sex stereotyping prohibition to require trait neutrality of this formalistic sort.90 After
Price Waterhouse, as before, courts have routinely upheld sex-specific
grooming codes such as those requiring that men but not women wear their
hair short91 and those requiring that men but not women refrain from
wearing earrings.92 Similarly, in Jespersen the court paid lip service to the
89 For a more extensive discussion of the likely results of trait neutrality, see Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 167, 198-204 (2004).
90 Certainly the Sixth Circuit in Smith did use language suggesting a formalistic traitneutrality requirement of this sort. Yet, the broad language used in Smith, like that used by the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, is more accurately viewed as judicial rhetoric than legal
reality. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (“After Price Waterhouse, an
employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or
makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the
victim’s sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses
and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”).
91 See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(holding that a male employee terminated for not complying with the employer’s hair-length
requirement for men could not state a claim for sex discrimination); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co.,
549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming that “[e]mployer grooming codes requiring different
hair lengths for men and women” are not a violation of Title VII); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding hair-length regulation to not be a violation of
Title VII, in part because hair length is not an immutable characteristic); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that “requiring short
hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d
1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that an employer’s grooming requirements did not constitute
sex discrimination because the policies were “reasonable” and “evenhanded”); Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a male plaintiff’s
allegation of dismissal on the basis of hair length was not sex discrimination as hair length is
neither immutable nor a protected characteristic); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898
(9th Cir. 1974) (holding that an employer may impose standards of grooming on males that are
inapplicable to females); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“We do
not believe that Title VII was intended to invalidate grooming regulations which have no
significant effect upon the employment opportunities afforded one sex in favor of the other.”).
92 See, e.g., Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
31, 2000) (agreeing with other federal courts that a grooming code allowing female but not male
employees to wear earrings did not violate Title VII); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union,
No. 86-1944, 1987 WL 9687, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (determining that an allegedly
unwritten grooming code prohibiting men but not women from wearing earrings does not
constitute sex discrimination); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 2003)
(“Personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant
impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of
[Title VII].”); MacIssac v. Remington Hospitality, Inc., No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 1541807, at *2
(Mass. App. Ct. July 9, 2004) (affirming a lower court judgment that enforcement of a grooming
code prohibiting male but not female employees from wearing earrings did not constitute sex
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prohibition on sex stereotyping, but did not interpret it to demand formal
gender neutrality in any literal sense.93 Jespersen could be fired for not
wearing makeup even though male employees were permitted—indeed
required—to not wear makeup.94
Reading the prohibition on sex stereotyping as a demand for trait
neutrality may seem appealing because it maps easily onto conventional
legal and social conceptions of nondiscrimination. Yet, to be workable in a
society with rich gender norms, trait neutrality requires a kind of genderblind formalism. Such neutrality in practice would be culturally transformative, not conservative. It is this fact that perhaps best explains why courts
have not applied the prohibition as a trait-neutrality requirement.
IV. CATEGORY NEUTRALITY
It may be that the sex stereotyping prohibition does not require trait
neutrality but a narrower form of category neutrality. Under this reading,
the prohibition on sex stereotyping requires that employers be neutral as to
the gender category into which workers fall. Workers may be required to
comply with the norms of one gender or the other, but workers may not be
forced into the “wrong” gender box simply because of their biological sex.95
Certainly there is much about the recent transsexual sex discrimination
case law that is suggestive of, or at least consistent with, a reading of the sex
stereotyping prohibition as requiring category neutrality. In Smith, for
example, the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, began expressing a
more feminine appearance at work and told his supervisor of his intention
to transition completely to a fully feminine appearance.96 Similarly, in
Barnes, the plaintiff was a male-to-female transsexual who lived as a woman
off-duty and who began to adopt a more feminine appearance at work as
well as part of her overall transition.97 In Schroer, the plaintiff was a male-tofemale transsexual who was offered a position while expressing a masculine

discrimination); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
a grooming code prohibiting male but not female employees from wearing facial jewelry did not
constitute sex discrimination).
93 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
94 Id. at 1107. Indeed, it is likely that a man would have been fired for wearing makeup, as
this was in violation of the “Personal Best” guidelines for men.
95 For a reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition consistent with this approach, see
Gilden, supra note 9, at 99. Gilden notes that “[w]hether an individual brings sex-stereotyping
claims as either male or female, she is forced to make some claim of truth about who she really is
within an unexamined binary biological framework.” Id.
96 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
97 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2005).
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gender identity and was subsequently denied the position when she told her
supervisor that she would be expressing a feminine gender identity on the
job.98 In all cases, the plaintiffs sought the right to express their “true”
gender on the job despite its disconnect with their biological sex. None of
the plaintiffs challenged gender categories per se, only their assignment
between them. A requirement that employers be neutral as to the gender
category into which workers fall can explain courts’ protection of such
plaintiffs.
The category-neutrality reading can also explain courts’ often heavy
reliance in the transsexual cases on medical evidence regarding GID. Such
evidence serves to substantiate the plaintiff’s “true” gender and to identify
the appropriate gender code to which she may be subject at work. In Smith,
for example, the court noted at the outset that Smith was “a transsexual and
has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder . . . which the American
Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual’s
sexual organs and sexual identity.”99 The court went on to explain that
when Smith “began expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time
basis” she did so “in accordance with international medical protocols for
treating GID.”100
In Schroer, the court received expert testimony from a clinical social
worker with expertise in gender identity issues who had been providing
counseling to the plaintiff.101 The expert testified that Schroer had GID and
that she “has a female gender identity and is a woman.”102 The result of
such testimony was the court’s confident assertion that “Diane Schroer is a
male-to-female transsexual. Although born male, Schroer has a female
gender identity—an internal, psychological sense of herself as a woman.”103
Similarly, in Doe v. Yunits, a case involving a claim of sex discrimination
in education, rather than employment, the court referenced testimony from
98 Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-99 (D.D.C. 2008).
99 Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
100 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
101 Expert Report of Martha L. Harris, LCSW at para. 22(b),

Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203
(D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517048 [hereinafter Harris Report].
102 Id. at para. 22(a). The Schroer court also received more general testimony from two other
experts. Walter Bockting, a clinical psychologist, served as a second expert for the plaintiff and
provided general background information about gender identity and the diagnosis and treatment
of Gender Identity Disorder. Expert Report of Walter O. Bockting, PhD at paras. 13-32, Schroer I,
424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517046 [hereinafter Bockting Report]. Chester
Schmidt, a psychiatrist, served as an expert for the defendant. He emphasized the distinction
between one’s sex and one’s gender role. He also testified that the causes of Gender Identity
Disorder were not known. Expert Report of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., MD at paras. 5-8, Schroer I,
424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517051.
103 Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
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Doe’s treating psychologist, a professor of social work with expertise on
transgendered children, in assessing Doe’s likelihood of success on the
merits of her sex discrimination claim.104 Doe was a fifteen-year-old student
who, although biologically male, began wearing “girls’ make-up, shirts, and
fashion accessories to school.”105 When she arrived at school in girls’ apparel,
the principal would often send her home to change.106 The following year, the
principal instructed Doe, then an eighth grader, to come by his office every
day so that he could approve her appearance. The principal would send Doe
home when he found her appearance to be too feminine.107 At the start of
the following year, when Doe was to repeat eighth grade due to her many
absences, the principal told Doe that she “would not be permitted to enroll
if she wore any girls’ clothing or accessories.”108 Doe sued for sex discrimination under the Massachusetts Constitution and also filed a motion for
preliminary injunction.109
Relying on the testimony of Doe’s therapist, the court explained that
she had been “diagnosed with gender identity disorder, which means that,
although plaintiff was born biologically male, she has a female gender
identity.”110 In light of such medical evidence, the court explained that the
“right question” in assessing Doe’s sex discrimination claim was “whether a
female student would be disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff
chooses to wear.”111 The court concluded that the “[p]laintiff is likely to
establish that defendants have discriminated against her on the basis of sex
by applying the dress code against her in a manner in which it would not be
applied to female students.”112 In other words, the school could force Doe to
comply with a sex-specific gender code, but it could not force her into the

104 No. 00-1060-A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom.
Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
105 Id. at *1.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at *2.
109 In interpreting the sex discrimination provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, the
Massachusetts Superior Court found “persuasive” the plaintiff’s reliance on the sex stereotyping
prohibition articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Id. at *6. In response to the plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the court found that Doe had shown a likelihood of success on
her sex discrimination claim. Id. at *7.
In addition to the sex discrimination claim, Doe also brought state law claims alleging a denial
of freedom of expression, disability discrimination, denial of liberty interest in appearance, denial
of due process, and denial of the right to personal dress and appearance. Id. at *2.
110 Id. at *1.
111 Id. at *6.
112 Id. at *6 n.6.
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wrong gender category. Medical evidence was critical to determining the
right category.
Finally, the category-neutrality reading can help explain why courts
have been using the sex stereotyping prohibition to protect transsexual
workers from sex-based dress and grooming codes while denying similar
protection to nontranssexual workers.
Compare, for example, the results in Smith and Doe with those in Jespersen and Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough County,113 a case with facts
similar to those in Doe.
In both Smith and Doe, the plaintiffs claimed that they were really women
trapped in men’s bodies. They argued that they were being forced into the
wrong gender category as a result of their biological sex. The courts in both
cases found such allegations to state actionable claims of sex discrimination.
In contrast, Jespersen could not and did not argue that she had GID or
that she was really a man trapped in a woman’s body. She did not disavow
her female gender completely, but instead objected to particular gender
conventions.114 As the Ninth Circuit stressed, Jespersen objected to the
makeup requirement because “wearing it would conflict with her self
image.”115 Jespersen was not being forced into the wrong gender box; she
was merely being forced to comply more fully with the demands associated
with the gender to which she ascribed. In other words, although Jespersen
was being sex stereotyped in a colloquial sense, she was not being miscategorized. She was, of course, denied antidiscrimination protection.116
Consider as well the case of Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough
County.117 Nikki Youngblood was a seventeen-year-old high school senior in
Hillsborough County, Florida who objected to wearing a scoop neck drape
for her senior yearbook picture.118 Youngblood wore a shirt and tie to her
senior photo and was told that the school’s dress code for the yearbook
photos required that all girls wear a “velvetlike, scoop-neck drape.”119
Youngblood refused to wear the drape and the school left her picture out of
113
114

No. 02-1089-24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2002) (order granting motion to dismiss).
Jespersen did not object to Harrah’s other gendered appearance requirements. Female
employees were, for example, required to have their hair “teased, curled, or styled every day”
while male employees were simply prohibited from having hair “extend below top of shirt collar.”
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
115 Id. at 1108. Jespersen also stated that the makeup requirement undermined her “selfdignity.” Id.
116 Id. at 1113.
117 Youngblood, No. 02-1089-24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2002) (order granting motion to dismiss).
118 See id. at 1; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms under the Transgender Umbrella, in
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 7 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
119 See Currah, supra note 115.
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the yearbook.120 Youngblood sued for sex discrimination and lost. Indeed,
the court held that she was not even able to state a claim.121
As in Jespersen, and unlike in Smith and Doe, Youngblood’s lawyers could
not, and did not try to, convince the judge that Youngblood’s gender was
actually male. Youngblood’s attorneys could not rely on a diagnosis of GID.
Instead, they could only “describe [Youngblood’s] aversion to feminine
clothing as ‘deepseated’ and ‘longlasting.’”122 Yet, for the court, such
testimony—unsupported as it was by medical evidence or clear diagnosis—
was insufficient to establish any legal right.123
A category-neutrality reading cannot, however, make sense of the full
range of cases implicating the sex stereotyping prohibition. The reading can
explain why courts deny protection to nontranssexuals who violate sexspecific grooming codes, but it cannot explain why courts have used the sex
stereotyping prohibition to protect effeminate men (and masculine women)
from harassment. Like the plaintiffs who challenge discrete sex-specific
grooming codes, the plaintiffs in these cases are not seeking to switch
gender categories. Consider, for example, the plaintiffs in Doe v. City of
Belleville,124 Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,125 and Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc.126 In Doe, the plaintiffs were two sixteen-year-old brothers
who were taunted because their older male coworkers perceived them to be
effeminate.127 In Nichols, the plaintiff was a man whose male coworkers
referred to him using female pronouns and mocked him for walking and
carrying his serving tray “like a woman.”128 Similarly, in Rene, the plaintiff
120
121

Id.
See id. at 11 (“Ruling on the school board’s motion to dismiss the case, the federal district
court judge in Youngblood’s case . . . found ‘no constitutionally protected right for a female to
wear a shirt and tie for senior portraits.’”).
122 Id. at 10 (quoting plaintiff’s Appeal of a Final Order of the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida at 2-3, Youngblood v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 02-15924 (11th Cir.
May 5, 2003)).
123 As Paisley Currah has noted, the ruling in Youngblood:
depended on and reproduced the same commonsense notions about gender that
undergirded the judge’s reasoning in Doe v. Yunits: Pat Doe and Nikki Youngblood
are both girls, and girls do and should wear girls’ clothes. Doe v. Yunits was a legal
victory because the judge . . . affirmed Doe’s gender identity. Youngblood v. School
Board of Hillsborough County was a legal defeat because the judge in this case found
the gender expression claim unfathomable.
Id. at 11-12.
124 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
125 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
126 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
127 119 F.3d at 566-67.
128 256 F.3d at 870 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was a gay man whose male coworkers teased him because of the way that he
walked, referred to him using female terms of endearment, and touched him
in sexual ways.129 None of these plaintiffs was a man seeking to become, or
claiming to be, a woman. None challenged sex-specific grooming codes.130
Instead, all were men perceived to fit imperfectly within the male gender
category and who became, as a result, a target of harassment and discrimination. The courts in all three cases held that the alleged harassment violated
Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping.131 A principle of category
neutrality cannot explain courts’ willingness to invoke the prohibition on
sex stereotyping to protect these workers who blur rather than jump gender
categories.
A category-neutrality requirement also implicates some of the same
conceptual problems raised by the trait-neutrality requirement. Category
neutrality requires that employers be neutral as to which gender category
workers satisfy. It does not require employers to accept new or blurry
gender categories. When, however, is a male-to-female transsexual expressing
a feminine gender identity in the same way as a biological woman, and
when is she occupying some third gender category?132 Indeterminacy in
naming what the plaintiff is doing leads, as it did with the trait-neutrality
requirement, to indeterminacy in assessing whether neutrality is violated or
achieved.
Perhaps courts’ focus in applying the sex stereotyping prohibition is not
on avoiding the narrow harm of gender miscategorization, but on avoiding
the more general harm of highly burdensome gender demands that make
workplace participation for some workers particularly difficult. In the next
Part, I suggest that, while not doing so explicitly, courts have in fact
129
130

305 F.3d at 1064.
One of the brothers in Doe, H., did wear an earring, which seemed to incite some harassment. 119 F.3d at 566-67. In doing so, however, H. did not violate any workplace grooming code,
and H., like the other plaintiffs in these cases, seemed to comply with any formal and informal
dress and grooming codes applied to men in these workplaces.
131 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (“[T]his is a case of actionable gender
stereotyping harassment.”); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (“Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes. That rule squarely applies to preclude the harassment
here.”); Doe, 119 F.3d at 581 (relying on Price Waterhouse’s prohibition on sex stereotyping to
conclude that “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is
long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his
coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex”).
132 This question of whether a cross-dressing plaintiff occupies a conventional gender category
or some new category was a critical one for the court in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114,
2002 WL 31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (finding the plaintiff had not failed to conform
to a gender stereotype, but rather “disguised himself as a person of a different sex and presented
himself as a female for stress relief and to express his gender identity”).
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adopted a burden-shifting framework for analyzing and applying the sex
stereotyping prohibition, with the compliance costs for the plaintiff being
the prime trigger for switching the evidentiary burden to the employer.
V. BURDEN SHIFTING
It may be that the sex stereotyping prohibition in practice reflects not a
discrete principle, but instead a process for evaluating employee challenges
to gender conformity demands. In assessing a claim, courts first look to see
how burdensome the conformity demand is for the plaintiff. Only if a
threshold level is reached does a presumption of impermissibility attach.
Even then, however, the presumption can be overcome if the employer can
show a business justification for the demand. Although never stated explicitly,
the sex stereotyping prohibition operates, in effect, as a burden-shifting
framework.
While a violation of neither gender freedom nor neutrality alone triggers
protection from a conformity demand under the sex stereotyping prohibition,
both factors contribute to the overall burdensomeness of a conformity
demand, and hence may play a role in the burden-shifting framework. It
certainly did matter to the Sixth Circuit in Smith, for example, that the
behavior for which the plaintiff sought protection was recognized by the
court as a conventional expression of gender.133 Had Smith sought protection
for some entirely idiosyncratic form of personal expression—like wearing a
Barney costume—she certainly would have lost. The fact that gender
expression is at stake matters. It may help the plaintiff reach the threshold
needed for protection, but it simply does not get the plaintiff there on its
own.
The fact that a plaintiff is using the sex stereotyping prohibition to
redress nonneutral treatment is likewise significant. A transsexual male-tofemale plaintiff who wants to wear a dress to work, in contravention of her
employer’s grooming code, is more likely to win if the challenged grooming
code allows women, but not men, to wear dresses, than if the grooming code
requires that all employees wear blue pants and white oxford shirts to work.
Courts’ commitment to neutral treatment is real; it is simply not outcome
determinative in the way courts’ rhetoric suggests.
The factor that seems most critical to whether the employee reaches the
threshold necessary to raise a presumption of illegality is the one about
133 See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that Smith “began
‘expressing a more feminine appearance’” at work and was challenged by coworkers because her
“appearance and mannerisms were not ‘masculine enough’”).
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which courts have been least explicit—namely, the level of difficulty for the
plaintiff to comply with the gender demand at issue. High compliance
costs—physical, emotional, or professional134—seem essential to reaching the
threshold level necessary to shift the evidentiary burden. When compliance
with a gender demand is very difficult for an employee, the presumption of
illegality attaches. Plaintiffs then win protection unless the employer is able
to name a business justification of some special weight.135 When compliance
with a gender demand appears easy or trivial, the threshold is not met, and
courts never even look to see whether the employer has a business justification for the conformity demand.
Courts’ concern with the difficulty of compliance provides an alternative
explanation to the category-neutrality reading for courts’ heavy reliance on
medical evidence in these cases. Medical testimony regarding GID points
not only to one’s gender category, but also necessarily to the pain one would
experience if forced to alter a particular gender expression.
Indeed, evidence of the plaintiff’s pain seemed critical to the court’s
ruling in Doe v. Yunits, where the court relied on expert medical testimony
to conclude that forcing the plaintiff to come to school in boys’ clothes
would actually “endanger her psychiatric health.”136 Moreover, the medical
evidence helped the court to distinguish Doe from Harper v. Edgewood Board
of Education137 in which a court upheld a school board’s right to prevent two
students from attending the prom in clothing of the opposite gender. In
that case, the court treated the students’ efforts to gender bend as a matter
of whimsy or teenage rebellion. Doe, the Yunits court emphasized, in
contrast to Harper, “is not merely engaging in rebellious acts to demonstrate
a willingness to violate community norms; plaintiff is expressing her
personal identity . . . .”138 As such, the costs of compliance for Doe, with her
school’s gender conformity demands, were significantly higher, and it was
these costs that were critical to her ultimate victory.
Medical evidence appeared to play a similar role in Smith. Smith, the
court emphasized, suffered from Gender Identity Disorder. Her female
gender expression, through dress and grooming, was part of the accepted
134 A gender conformity demand would be professionally difficult for the plaintiff to comply
with if it conflicted with actual job demands. This situation would capture the narrow set of
double-bind cases with fact patterns similar to that in Price Waterhouse.
135 By some “special” weight, I mean some justification beyond a generalized desire for
comfort on the part of the employer and its customers.
136 No. 00-1060, 2001 WL 664947, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001).
137 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
138 Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)
(granting the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction).
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medical treatment of her condition.139 As in Yunits, this information seemed
important to the court because it reinforced that for Smith, cross-dressing
was not a voluntary choice but a medical necessity—one that could be
avoided only with great pain and hardship.140
Likewise in Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp.,141 the court relied on medical
evidence to highlight the involuntary nature of the plaintiff’s gender
nonconformity. Lie, a preoperative male-to-female transsexual, sued for sex
discrimination under state law after she was fired for wearing female clothes
to work.142 The trial court, in denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, emphasized the plaintiff’s evidence showing her lack of control
over her gender expressions. The court explained:
The plaintiff avers that she is a biological male who has desired to live as a
woman for a number of years, that she has been diagnosed with gender
identity disorder, that she engages in psychotherapy, and that she takes
hormones as part of her treatment . . . . Consequently, the plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts to establish she is a transsexual, not simply a man
who prefers traditionally female attire.143

Again, it was plaintiff’s lack of control over her own noncompliance that
seemed critical to Lie’s ultimate protection.
A burden-shifting framework can explain not only transsexuals’ recent
victories, but also the one type of case that transsexuals continue to routinely
lose: cases asserting transsexual workers’ right to use the bathroom appropriate to their gender rather than their sex. These cases are inexplicable
under the category-neutrality reading of the prohibition. Courts continue to
permit employers to “miscategorize” transsexual employees when it comes
to bathroom usage by requiring transsexual workers to use the bathroom
associated with their biological sex rather than their true gender. The cases
are, however, explicable under a burden-shifting framework. Courts permit
employers to require employees to use the bathroom associated with their
biological sex because they respect employers’ claims that such physically
based categorization is necessary to protect the personal privacy of other
restroom users. Although the transsexual plaintiffs are able to show compli139
140

Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 179 (2005) (“Although the [Smith] court did not say so
explicitly, this medical authority seemed to influence the court in seeing Smith’s behavior as
pursuant to trustworthy medical advice, and therefore less her fault or choice.”).
141 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 412 (Super. Ct. 2002).
142 Id. at 413.
143 Id.
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ance costs necessary to establish a presumption of illegality, employers in
the bathroom cases are able to rebut the presumption and avoid liability by
raising concerns about coworker and customer privacy.
Consider, for example, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority.144 Etsitty was a
preoperative male-to-female transsexual who had been diagnosed with
GID.145 At the time Etsitty began working as a bus operator with the Utah
Transit Authority (UTA) she presented herself as a man.146 Soon thereafter,
however, Etsitty informed her employer that she was transsexual and would
begin to present as female at work and to use female restrooms while on her
route.147 The UTA terminated Etsitty explaining that it was unable to
“accommodate her restroom needs.”148 Etsitty sued for sex discrimination
and lost.149 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendants on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.150
Certainly Etsitty’s gender expression was difficult for her to change. In
addition to being diagnosed with GID, Etsitty had begun the transition
from male to female by taking female hormones.151 Nonetheless, the court
ruled against Etsitty on her sex discrimination claim. Although Etsitty had
made out a “prima facie” case of sex stereotyping, the court concluded that
the employer had a legitimate business justification for burdening the
plaintiff’s gender expression in this way.152 The court’s reference in Etsitty
to a “prima facie” case is strange, but revealing. The language nominally
tracks the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas,153 which was
designed to help courts identify the true reason behind the employer’s
adverse employment action. In Etsitty, however, there was no dispute over
the reason for the employer’s decision. It was clear that the employer made
its decision about bathroom usage because of Etsitty’s sex. The Etsitty
court’s use of McDonnell Douglas–type language does suggest, however, that
it is using a similar burden-shifting framework to determine liability, albeit
with different underlying evidentiary assessments at stake. Even though the
UTA had not received any complaints about Etsitty’s bathroom usage,154 the
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1219-20
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1224.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The complainant in a
Title VII trial must carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination.”).
154 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1226.
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UTA’s “legitimate” concerns about potential liability from having a biological
male use women’s public restrooms justified its prohibition on her doing so
and overcame any presumption of illegality.155 In terms of outcome, the
Etsitty ruling is typical. Preoperative transsexual plaintiffs routinely lose sex
discrimination cases in which they challenge their employers’ bathroom
assignments.156
It is worth emphasizing how different my reading of the transsexual sex
discrimination cases is from that offered by scholars who adopt a more
libertarian view of the prohibition at work in the cases. Elizabeth Glazer
and Zachary Kramer, in their article Transitional Discrimination,157 as well as
155

Id. at 1224. The court explained:
The record also reveals UTA believed, and Etsitty has not demonstrated otherwise,
that it was not possible to accommodate her bathroom usage because UTA drivers
typically use public restrooms along their routes rather than restrooms at the UTA
facility. UTA states it was concerned the use of women’s public restrooms by a biological male could result in liability for UTA. This court agrees with the district
court that such a motivation constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Etsitty’s termination under Title VII.

Id. Although the court does not elaborate on the basis for UTA’s potential liability, the intimation
is that the liability would stem from invasion of privacy claims brought by other restroom users.
156 See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 F. App’x 461, 462 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(affirming without explanation the district court’s dismissal of a female transsexual worker’s Title
VII sex discrimination claim based on the employer’s requirement that she use the men’s rather
than the women’s restroom); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531, 2006 WL
2460636, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on a male-to-female transsexual worker’s claim of sex discrimination stemming from her
employer’s requirement that she could not use the women’s restroom until she had presented
proof that she had completed a sex change operation), aff’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009). But
see Michaels v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 09-01300, 2010 WL 2573988, at *4 (D. Colo. June 24, 2010)
(agreeing with Etsitty that restrictions on a transsexual worker’s bathroom usage does not itself
establish sex discrimination, but holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded pretext to
survive a motion to dismiss). Bathroom discrimination claims brought under state statutes
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination have been similarly unsuccessful. See Goins v. W.
Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Minn. 2001) (holding that an employer’s requirement that a maleto-female transsexual use only a unisex restroom rather than the women’s restroom did not
constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act,
which defined sexual orientation to include “having or being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness” (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 363.01 (2000)). This provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act has been renumbered
as § 363A.03. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West 2008).
Certainly these are not the first cases in which courts have subordinated employees’ antidiscrimination interests to the privacy interests of customers or coworkers. Courts regularly
privilege such privacy interests in cases in which employers seek to engage in sex-based hiring of
workers engaged in positions that involve the seeing or touching of unclothed customers or
coworkers. See Yuracko, supra note 68, at 156-57.
157 Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009).
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Anna Kirkland, in her book Fat Rights,158 criticize courts’ decisions in the
transsexual sex discrimination cases for not giving enough weight to plaintiffs’
transsexualism. They argue that the sex stereotyping prohibition reduces
these plaintiffs to men who simply like to wear women’s clothes and reduces
the protection they seek to mere protection for cross-dressing. Glazer and
Kramer, for example, argue that under the court’s approach in Smith,
“Smith’s reasons for wanting to change her appearance in the workplace
simply did not matter; the only thing that did matter for the court’s theory
to work is that Smith wanted to dress and behave in a way that is incompatible with stereotypical expectations of masculinity.”159 Similarly, Kirkland
contends that “[t]ranssexuals or transgender people per se do not really exist
in the Smith opinion; there just happen to be some men out there who want
to wear dresses.”160
In contrast, I argue that transsexuals are successful under the sex stereotyping prohibition precisely because they are not simply men wearing
women’s clothes and, in large part, because they are transsexual. Transsexuals
are winning because they are able to use medical evidence of their GID to
convince courts that compliance with sex-based gender norms would be
particularly painful and difficult for them.161 Such evidence of pain creates a
presumption of illegality and switches the burden of proof to the employer.
Indeed, the burden-shifting framework helps explain why transsexuals
are succeeding in their challenges to sex-based grooming requirements while
158

ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD

(2008).

159
160

Glazer & Kramer, supra note 157, at 666.
KIRKLAND, supra note 158, at 86; see also Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in Transgender
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination?, 32 SIGNS 83, 94 (2006) (“The [Smith] case reduces the story
of gender oppression to a story about stereotypes and makes [male-to-female transsexuals] into
men who wear dresses and makeup.”).
161 The instrumental importance of medical evidence in these cases has not been lost on
transsexual advocates. See Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity
of Sex-Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1738, 1758 (2002) (noting that “[t]he
explanation of transgender identities in medical and diagnostic terms is common throughout the
case law, even in cases that do not deal specifically with sex-reassignment surgery or sex designation,” and that “it is the transgender party who inserts the medical analysis into the record” as a
strategic way to give “legitimacy to a transgender identity”); see also Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t
Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 90-91
(2006) (explaining that the recent success of some transgender litigants is due to their ability to
introduce medical evidence of their GID to highlight for the court “the essentialism of gender
identity and its inelasticity for a specific individual”); Romeo, supra note 9, at 733 (“The result of
courts’ reliance on the medical model of gender is that those instances of gender nonconformity
recognized by the medical establishment are portrayed as real and legitimate—and therefore
worthy of at least some legal protections—while other transgressive experiences of gender are
viewed as unreal, fraudulent, or illegitimate.”).
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nontranssexuals are not. Under a burden-shifting framework, nontranssexual gender benders lose precisely because courts view the burden of
the conformity demands imposed on them as trivial. They do not reach the
threshold level necessary even to warrant a response or justification by their
employer. In Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court upheld an employer’s right to terminate a male employee for refusing
to remove his ear stud; it emphasized that the requirement was one with
which the employee could easily comply.162 “Wearing an ear stud is not an
immutable characteristic,” the court noted.163 “Pecenka can remove his ear
stud or cover it with a bandage.”164 Similarly, in Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the district court upheld an employer’s sex-specific requirement that
male employees keep their hair above the collar, emphasizing that “hair
length is not an immutable characteristic, for it may be changed at will.”165
“[D]iscrimination based on factors of personal preference” the court
explained, “do not necessarily restrict employment opportunities and thus
are not forbidden.”166 In Jespersen as well, the court seemed to belittle the
burden of the makeup requirement on Jespersen by emphasizing that
compliance, or lack thereof, was simply a matter of personal choice.167
According to the court, Jespersen’s desire not to wear makeup was based on
her “subjective reaction”168 and desire “to be true to herself and to the image
that she wishe[d] to project to the world.”169

162
163
164

672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003).
Id. at 805.
Id. The court also emphasized that the employer’s male-only earring ban did not reinforce
women’s or men’s subordination in the workplace. The court noted that Pecenka did not “contend
that the unwritten personal grooming code perpetuates a sexist or chauvinistic attitude in employment that significantly affects his employment opportunities.” Id.; see also Lockhart v. La.-Pac.
Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 603 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a no facial jewelry rule for male, but not
female, employees explaining that “[o]nly those distinctions between the sexes which are based on
immutable, unalterable, or constitutionally protected personal characteristics are forbidden” (quoting
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Wash. Human Rights Comm’n, 544 P.2d 98, 100 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976))).
165 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
166 Id. at 1256. The Austin court also emphasized that the sex-specific grooming requirement
at issue did not raise antisubordination-oriented concerns. See id. (“The objective of Title VII is to
equalize employment opportunities. Consequently, discrimination based on either immutable sex
characteristics or constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or child rearing violate Title
VII because they present obstacles to the employment of one sex that cannot be overcome . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
167 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(refusing to extend Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping to “every grooming, apparel, or
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her
own self-image”).
168 Id. at 1113.
169 Id. at 1112.
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Unlike the category-neutrality reading, the burden-shifting framework
even offers a plausible explanation for courts’ protection of men harassed
because of their perceived effeminacy. The plaintiffs in such cases do not
seek to switch gender categories, but only to deviate from particular gender
expectations. As a result, such plaintiffs would not be entitled to protection
under the category-neutrality principle. It may be, however, that courts
protect effeminate men from harassment because they perceive the gender
conformity demands in those cases to be particularly difficult to meet.
Typically, male workers harassed for perceived effeminacy are not harassed
because of a discrete trait that they can easily change. Instead, they are
harassed because of how they walk, talk, and stand—traits that are largely
unconscious and difficult to alter. Moreover, employers in such cases do not
claim a business need for enforcing masculinity.
Consider, for example, the harassment suffered by Antonio Sanchez in
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.170 Sanchez, a food server, was
harassed for “walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman.’”171
Whatever it was about Sanchez’s movement that made Sanchez’s coworkers
refer to him as “she” and “her”172 was not susceptible to easy identification
or a quick fix. Indeed, the harassers themselves would probably have struggled to describe precisely what about Sanchez’s movements they found
objectionable. Even if they could, it would have been extremely difficult for
Sanchez to alter his walk and movements so as to eliminate the offending
affect. Changing one’s comportment and mannerisms is not like changing
one’s shirt. It is more like changing one’s way of being in the world.
Consider also the harassment faced by sixteen-year-old H. Doe in Doe v.
City of Belleville.173 H. Doe was subjected to repeated physical and verbal
harassment focused on his inadequate masculinity.174 Certainly, H. Doe’s
earring was a focal point of harassment.175 Yet it is unlikely that the harassment would have ceased, or never started, if H. Doe had simply removed
the earring.176 The harassment was prompted not by a discrete, easily
identifiable action on H. Doe’s part. It was prompted and driven by the

170
171
172
173
174

256 F.3d 864, 869-71 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 870.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 532 U.S. 1001 (1998).
Id. at 566-67. In addition to other incidents of physical and verbal harassment, H. Doe
was regularly called “queer” and “fag,” was asked, “Are you a boy or a girl?” and was referred to by
his primary harasser as his “bitch.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175 Id.
176 Indeed, H.’s brother J. was also harassed, albeit less severely, despite not wearing an
earring. See id. (describing incidents of harassment of J., including being referred to as “fat boy”).
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gestalt of how H. Doe presented himself—the way in which he occupied
and moved his body.177 As with Sanchez, identifying what exactly it was
about H. Doe’s self-presentation, much less getting H. Doe to change it,
would likely be impossible.178
This reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition as establishing a burdenshifting framework for analyzing claims is certainly more modest than
courts’ rhetoric suggests, yet it has real explanatory power. The prohibitionas-burden-shifting framework provides the most comprehensive and coherent
account of how the sex stereotyping prohibition currently operates. With
this model in mind of how the prohibition works in practice, rather than in
theory, I turn in the next Part to the likely legal and cultural implications of
the sex stereotyping prohibition at work.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Certainly, prohibiting sex stereotyping through a burden-shifting
framework will not, as some scholars have hoped, lead to an end of gender
code enforcement in the workplace. Courts’ heavy focus on compliance costs
means that employers may continue to enforce sex-based gender codes, even
when such codes are grounded in stereotypes, as long as courts deem
compliance relatively easy for workers. Employees may win protection from
such demands only when courts believe that compliance is particularly
burdensome.
In practice this means that those to whom I refer as “garden variety
gender benders”—those who do not seek to switch gender categories but
instead to reject discrete aspects of their prescribed gender code while
maintaining conformity with others—will (continue to) lack protection.
Male workers who are generally comfortable with their masculinity will not
be protected if they want to express their feminine side through dangling
earrings or nail polish in violation of their employer’s grooming code for
men. Female workers who are generally comfortable with their femininity
177 As the court explained: “H. Doe [did] not su[e] Belleville in order to challenge a workplace rule that forbade him from wearing an earring[;]” rather, he sued because “his gender had
something to do with the harassment heaped upon him.” Id. at 582.
178 Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Gowri Ramachandran have offered a slightly different
status-oriented reading of the effeminate men harassment cases—one focused on the status of
homosexuality rather than gender. They contend that by using the sex stereotyping rhetoric of
Price Waterhouse to protect effeminate men from harassment, courts “[q]uite possibly . . . were
engaging in subversive judging—namely, enacting a minor rebellion against the Congressional
refusal to provide any protection against sexual orientation discrimination.” Devon Carbado, Mitu
Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 137 ( Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
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will not be protected if they want to express a more masculine side by
rejecting such adornments in violation of their employer’s grooming code
for women. Such workers will be unable to convince courts that noncompliance reflects some essential gender core rather than more transient
personal preference. Without new medical evidence to the contrary, courts
will continue to view noncompliance as a matter of personal taste, and
compliance as relatively painless.
What may be less clear, and more pernicious, is that the burden-shifting
framework may actually reinforce gender stereotypes and encourage highly
stereotypical behavior in the workplace. Given the courts’ focus on compliance costs, employees must prove that the gender attribute at issue is a core
part of their gender identity. An attribute looks more essential to the extent
that it fits within a coherent gender package. As a result, in the quest for
protection, gender-bending workers have an incentive to exaggerate their
gender dysphoria by conforming those traits about which the worker feels
less strongly to the gender of the traits for which the worker seeks protection.
The result, somewhat oddly, is that workers may adopt a more extreme
gender dysphoria than they actually feel, and manifest this dysphoria
through more consistent and coherent expression of the opposite sex
gender.
This pressure to overperform dysphoria to the point of adopting a stereotypical gender package is clear in the transsexual cases. Indeed, the very
diagnosis of GID, which has been so important to transsexual victories,
requires allegiance to a traditional gender script, including stories of
childhood participation in stereotypically gender-inappropriate behavior,179

179 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15,
24 (2003) (“Symptoms of GID in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) describe at
length the symptom of childhood participation in stereotypically gender inappropriate behavior.”).
Spade further notes that

[t]he diagnostic criteria for GID produces a fiction of natural gender in which
normal, non-transsexual people grow up with minimal to no gender trouble or exploration, do not crossdress as children, do not play with the wrong-gendered toys,
and do not like the wrong kinds of toys and characters. This story is not believable.
Id. at 25. The DSM-IV-TR characterizes “boys” with GID as those who “particularly enjoy
playing house, drawing pictures of beautiful girls and princesses, and watching television or videos
of their favorite female characters . . . . They avoid rough-and-tumble play and competitive sports
and have little interest in cars and trucks . . . .” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576. The DSM-IVTR characterizes “girls” with GID as those who “display intense negative reactions to parental . . . attempts to have them wear dresses, . . . prefer boys’ clothing and short hair,” are interested
in “contact sports, [and] rough-and-tumble play.”). DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576-77.
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evidence of “a strong and persistent cross-gender identification”180 and “the
ability to inhabit and perform the new gender category ‘successfully.’”181
The diagnosis pressures transsexuals to downplay or reject aspects of their
gender identity that conform readily to their biological sex. As Franklin
Romeo has explained:
The diagnostic criteria of GID do not challenge gender norms so much as
they provide a mechanism for some people to substitute the gender norms
of their lived gender for the norms of their birth sex. Moreover, the medical
model of gender holds transgender people to hyper-normative standards
regarding their lived gender—thereby reifying the idea that ‘real’ men and
women look and act a certain way. These hyper-normative standards do not
reflect the experiences of a great number of gender nonconforming people,
and fail to recognize the complexity of experiences among gender transgressive people.182

Transsexual workers are pushed to play the part of highly stylized men and
women even if they would be more comfortable with mixed or ambiguous
gender packages.183
The pressure faced by nontranssexual workers is similar, though less
obvious. Under a burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff seeking protection
for gender-nonconforming conduct must convince a court that abandoning

180 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576. Such an identification “must not merely be a desire for
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex.” Id.
181 Spade, supra note 179, at 26. Spade is critical that “success” necessarily means adherence
to established gender norms. Id. For a female-to-male transsexual, tips for successful performance
of masculinity

focus on an adherence to traditional aesthetics of masculinity, warning [female-tomale transsexuals] to avoid “punk” hair cuts, black leather jackets and other trappings
associated with butch lesbians. A preppy, clean-cut look is often suggested as the
best aesthetic for passing. Again, this establishes the requirement that gender
transgressive people be even more “normal” than “normal people” when it comes to
gender presentation, thereby discouraging gender disruptive behavior.
Id. at 27 (describing the work of Judith Halberstam in her article, Transgender Butch: Butch/FTM
Border Wars and the Masculine Continuum, 4 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 287 (1998)).
182 Romeo, supra note 9, at 731.
183 See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal
Conceptualization of Gender that Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
253, 297 (2005) (“In my experience, a person who was assigned male at birth and identifies as
female has the best chance of having her self-identified gender confirmed by the courts if her
medical experts testify that she is a feminine woman, a woman who played with dolls when she
was young, a heterosexual woman, a woman with genital surgery, and so on. A gender nonconforming transgender person stands very little chance of having their self-identified gender
recognized by the courts.”).
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the trait at issue would be painful and difficult. One way to do so is to show
that the challenged gender expression is a function of the plaintiff’s core,
stable personality rather than an expression of individual autonomy or
personal taste. A plaintiff’s gender-nonconforming conduct is likely to look
more stable and immutable to the extent that it is part of a broad, consistent, and stereotypical pattern of gender nonconformity.
To see why this is so, consider again Darlene Jespersen’s challenge to
Harrah’s makeup requirement for female bartenders. Under a burdenshifting test, Jespersen would need to convince the court that compliance
with the rule would be psychically, if not physically, painful for her.
Transgender advocates in fact made precisely this argument on her behalf in
their amici brief. The National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Transgender Law Center argued that requiring Jespersen to wear makeup was
“contrary to [her] own innate identity and sense of self” and was “a serious,
invasive, and demeaning experience and may be as debilitating to an
individual as being subjected to sexual or gender-based harassment.”184 The
court was unconvinced and instead treated Jespersen’s desire to leave her
face makeup-free as simply a matter of personal preference.185 The court’s
skepticism may have stemmed in part from Jespersen’s failure to object to
any of the other feminine grooming requirements Harrah’s imposed on her.
Had Jespersen objected to all of Harrah’s feminine grooming requirements
and instead consistently sought to present herself according to Harrah’s
masculine grooming code, the court might have viewed her opposition to
makeup with a bit more respect. Certainly, such an unyielding position

184 Brief for Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Ctr. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, at 12, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006) (No. 03-15045), 2005 WL 1501598. More generally, the groups argued:

Just as a person’s core gender identity as male or female is innate, a person’s relative
degree of masculinity or femininity is also deep-seated and generally impervious to
manipulation or change . . . .
[W]orkplace rules affecting a person’s core gender identity and outward expression of masculinity or femininity are not trivial, but rather touch on profound and
fundamental aspects of the self. For an employer to require a person to adopt a
gendered appearance that conflicts with the person’s core identity is intrusive and
humiliating and may seriously impair a person’s well-being and ability to function.
Id. at 11-12.
185 See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (“We respect Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and
to the image that she wishes to project to the world. We cannot agree, however, that her objection
to the makeup requirement, without more, can give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title
VII. If we were to do so, we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel,
or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or
her own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.”).
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would have approached that of the plaintiffs in Smith and Yunits, both of
whom were granted gender nonconformity protection.
Indeed, the burden-shifting framework, with its high threshold for
protection, not only encourages a particular kind of gender performance, it
actually reinforces a particular understanding of gender. Again, such
entrenchment for transsexuals is clear. Reliance by courts on the medical
definition of GID entrenches in law and society a particular understanding
of how transsexuals experience their gender. Transsexuals must experience
and express a strong commitment to the gender norms typically associated
with the other sex.
There remains a great deal that is unknown about transsexualism.186
Certainly, it is possible that narratives about how transsexuals experience
gender may be erroneous or, at least, too narrow.187 Nonetheless, once
186 See Randi Ettner, The Etiology of Transsexualism, in PRINCIPLES OF TRANSGENDER
MEDICINE AND SURGERY 1, 9 (Randi Ettner et al. eds., 2007) (asserting that “the sheer sweeping
heterogeneity of the condition [transsexualism] itself impends a strictly biological explanation”);
P.T. Cohen-Kettenis & L.J.G. Gooren, Transsexualism: A Review of Etiology, Diagnosis and Treatment,
46 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 315, 318-19 (1999) (describing studies linking transsexualism to
prenatal hormone exposure or to sex differences in the hypothalamus); Frank P.M. Kruijver et al.,
Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2041 (2000) (presenting data supporting the view that
“transsexualism may reflect a form of brain hermaphroditism such that this limbic nucleus itself is
structurally sexually differentiated opposite to the transsexual’s genetic and genital sex” and noting
that “[i]t is conceivable that this dichotomy is just the tip of the iceberg and holds also true for
many other sexually dimorphic brain areas”); see also GEND. IDENTITY RESEARCH & EDUC.
SOC’Y, DEFINITION & SYNOPSIS OF THE ETIOLOGY OF GENDER VARIANCE 3 (July 18, 2009),
available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/Research-Assets/etiology.pdf (hypothesizing that “hormones significantly influence” the “dimorphic development” of gender though noting that “the exact
mechanism is incompletely understood”); GEND. IDENTITY RESEARCH & EDUC. SOC’Y, GENDER
VARIANCE (DYSPHORIA) 4 (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/gdev/
gender-dysphoria.pdf (discussing how “[t]he experience of extreme gender variance is increasingly
understood in scientific and medical disciplines as having a biological origin. The current medical
viewpoint . . . is that this condition . . . is strongly associated with unusual neurodevelopment of
the brain at the fetal stage”).
187 See, e.g., LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM
JOAN OF ARC TO RUPAUL ix (1996) (“[T]here are no pronouns in the English language as
complex as I am, and I do not want to simplify myself in order to neatly fit one or the other.”);
RIKI ANN WILCHINS, READ MY LIPS: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER 13
(1997) (“Under the broad label of transpeople . . . —there is an extraordinarily rich and vibrant
diversity.”); Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial
Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1999) (“Transsexuals vary widely in their
embrace or rejection of a specific ‘transexual identity,’ and in the creative manner in which they
combine or separate that identity, gender identity (whether they consider themselves ‘men’ or
‘women’), and sexual orientation identity. Those writings about transexuality are similarly varied
in their characterization of the phenomenon.”); Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Posttranssexual Manifesto, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY
280, 296 ( Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991) (“To foreground the practices of inscription
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courts rely on a particular medicalized conception of transsexualism, that
understanding becomes entrenched in law and society more generally.188 As
a result, those who do not experience transsexualism in the traditionally
prescribed ways will either be (newly) pathologized or discredited. Either
way, they are likely to be excluded from the current antidiscrimination
framework.189 Those who seek to avoid such exclusion must articulate, if not
actually experience, their gender in the ways courts say that they do.190
Courts’ reliance on the prevailing medical narrative about transsexualism
reifies not only transsexualism, but also gender more generally.191 Specifically, when medical experts testify that a plaintiff suffers from GID, they

and reading which are part of this deliberate invocation of dissonance, I suggest constituting
transsexuals not as a class or problematic ‘third gender,’ but rather as a genre—a set of embodied
texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has
yet to be explored.”); Vade, supra note 183, at 260 (“[S]ome male-to-female transgender people are
butch lesbians. Some female-to-male transgender people like to cook and bake. And there are
many transgender people who do not identify as either female or male, but as a third or other
gender, such [as] trans or boy-girl, just to name a few.”).
188 For a general discussion of the effect of such categorization in antidiscrimination law, see
Grenfell, supra note 9, at 52 (“Through the process of categorization, legal narratives effectively
strip the subject of agency by denying the subject the possibility of self-definition—for example,
the agency to assert whether one is female, male, or neither. In this way, legal categories become
constitutive of one’s identity . . . .”).
189 Academics have taken note of this trend. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 9, at 103 (“Much as
an essentialized male/female binary renders unintelligible alternative gender identities, the
articulation of an essentialized tertiary identity similarly marginalizes radical alternatives. If
transsexuality only encompasses those trans people like Schroer who have been medically
diagnosed as transsexuals and who conform to sex-stereotypes, then those trans people who most
challenge normative sex/gender ideologies remain marginalized by trans jurisprudence.”).
190 Dylan Vade makes this point quite concretely:
When courts only recognize as ‘real’ those transgender people who fit narrow gender
stereotypes, have multiple medical interventions, and engage in heterosexual intercourse, then courts only grant custody, health benefits, and employment protections
to transgender people who fit narrow gender stereotypes, have multiple medical
interventions, and engage in heterosexual intercourse. Those clients of mine who do
not fit the above requirements cannot make use of the legal protections. As a legal
advocate for transgender people, this is a concern I face every day.
Vade, supra note 183, at 256. For a more positive account of the role medical professionals play in
improving the social and legal treatment of transsexuals, see Jennifer L. Levi, A Prescription for
Gender: How Medical Professionals Can Help Secure Equality for Transgender People, 4 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 721, 735-36 (2003) (explaining that “medical experts can help to develop empathy in
the greater community toward transgender litigants and, more specifically, help individual
litigants to secure rights by chipping away at deeply held cultural prejudices that do not reflect
medical realities”).
191 Cf. Gilden, supra note 9, at 96-97 (“In describing a ‘biologically male’ transsexual as
performing feminine acts, it furthers the construction of particular acts as inherently feminine and
normatively conflated with biological femaleness.”).
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are saying something not only about transsexualism but about femininity
and masculinity more generally.192
Consider, for example, the court’s effort in Doe v. Yunits to translate the
documented medical evidence about transsexualism into “non-medical
terminology.”193 According to the court, a diagnosis of GID signifies that
“Doe has the soul of a female in the body of a male.”194 Having the soul of a
female meant that Doe needed to wear stereotypically female clothing,195
and that coming to school in boys’ clothing would “endanger her psychiatric
health.”196 While Doe made this latter contention and did not need to prove
it in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court did note approvingly that
“there is evidence in the court file to support this allegation.”197
In Schroer, the plaintiff presented testimony from two expert witnesses.
The first was a medical doctor and the second was a licensed social worker
who served as Schroer’s treating therapist during her transition. The
medical doctor testified that “gender identity can be viewed as the sex of
the brain, which, once established, cannot be changed.”198 Transsexuals, he
explained, “experience incongruence between their sex assigned at birth and
their gender identity.”199 The therapist spoke more specifically about her
diagnosis of Schroer as transsexual. She testified that Schroer “has a female
gender identity and is a woman.”200 The therapist explained that she had
reached her conclusion by “continually assess[ing] [Schroer’s] female

192 See Keller, supra note 187, at 353 (“The most common or notorious model for describing
the transsexual condition, by academics writing about transsexuals, by transsexuals themselves, and
by judges, is a vision of the transsexual as a woman/man trapped in a man/woman’s body.”); Levi,
supra note 190, at 736 (describing the “classic description” of transsexuals as “being trapped in the
‘wrong body’”); Vade, supra note 183, at 285 (“Transgender people often are defined as ‘having a
mismatch of gender and sex.’”).
193 No. 00-1060, 2001 WL 664947, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001) (denying in part
defendants’ motion to dismiss).
194 Id. Similarly, in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction in the Doe v. Yunits litigation, the court asserted that the “[p]laintiff has been diagnosed with gender identity disorder,
which means that, although plaintiff was born biologically male, she has a female gender identity.”
Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff ’d sub
nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-638, 2000 WL 33342399, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Nov. 30, 2000).
195 For Doe, female clothing involved “such items as skirts and dresses, wigs, high-heeled
shoes, and padded bras with tight shirts.” Id. at *1.
196 Yunits, 2001 WL 664947, at *6.
197 Id.
198 See Bockting Report, supra note 102, at ¶ 32.
199 See Supplemental Report of Walter O. Bockting, PhD at para. 5, Schroer II, 525 F. Supp.
2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 05-1090), 2006 WL 4517047.
200 Harris Report, supra note 101, at para. 22.
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feelings and expression” and “evaluat[ing] Ms. Schroer’s life story.”201 She
found evidence of Schroer’s womanhood in “Ms. Schroer’s level of crossdressing, her internal feelings about being female, [and] her inherent need
to present as female.”202 In other words, in order to reach her conclusion
that Schroer was transsexual, Schroer’s therapist needed to conclude that
Schroer was a woman trapped in a man’s body. Schroer was a woman, the
therapist knew, because Schroer did and thought what women do and think.
However, even if the current medical establishment is correct about how
most transsexuals experience their gender, it may still be mistaken in
equating transsexuals’ experience of gender with that of nontranssexuals.203
It is possible, for example, that transsexuals may have particularly strong
gender associations that make cross-gender manifestations particularly
painful.204 Transsexuals may experience gender more acutely than nontranssexuals. Nontranssexuals may have weaker gender commitments than
transsexuals.205
Alternatively, even if transsexuals and nontranssexuals experience their
core gender identity in similar ways, outward manifestations of gender may
be more important for transsexuals than they are for nontranssexuals.
Transsexuals may find that highly traditional outward gender manifestations are critically important to their gender identity because they simply
cannot be recognized as their true gender unless their outward manifestations

201
202
203

Id. at paras. 26 & 28.
Id. at para. 28.
For example, male-to-female transsexuals may not in fact experience their gender in the
same ways that nontranssexual women experience theirs. See SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX
COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW 140 (2007) (describing her observation of a
conference, during which female academics reacted to a transsexual scholar by complaining that
the scholar did not understand what made them “women,” but instead mistook being a woman for
wearing “a lot of makeup and very stereotypically feminine clothing”).
204 See WORLD PROF’L ASS’N OF TRANSGENDER HEALTH, INC., THE HARRY BENJAMIN
INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION’S STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER
IDENTITY DISORDER 2 (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf
(“A clinical threshold [for transsexualism] is passed when concerns, uncertainties, and questions
about gender identity persist during a person’s development, become so intense as to seem to be
the most important aspect of a person’s life, or prevent the establishment of a relatively unconflicted gender identity.”); see also Cohen-Kettenis & Gooren, supra note 186, at 319-20 (noting that
“[n]ot all children with GID will turn out to be transsexuals after puberty” and explaining that it
might be that “only very few extreme cases would become transsexuals, whereas the mild cases
would become homo- or heterosexuals”).
205 There exist highly divergent views about how nontranssexuals experience their gender.
Compare Romeo, supra note 9, at 738-39 (arguing that gender should be recognized as “a fundamental aspect of human life, which every person has the capacity and inherent right to control”),
with Levi, supra note 161, at 91 (“[U]ntil courts understand the inelasticity of gender for most
individuals alongside its social construction, sex discrimination claims will have limited utility.”).
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of gender are clear, strong, and uniform. Nontranssexuals may have much
less difficulty having their gender recognized even if they send a range of
more mixed and ambivalent signals through their outward manifestations—
clothes, hair, makeup, jewelry, etc. For both reasons, cross-gender manifestations may be trivial for nontranssexuals while being truly painful for
transsexuals.
If, however, courts believe that women have female souls and that such
souls require women to wear stereotypically feminine clothing, then the
pain of women like Jespersen, who seek to challenge some but not all
feminine gender conventions, will always be invisible. For Jespersen,
wearing makeup should be pleasing and certainly could not be painful.
Similarly, courts may be too willing to believe that women experience pain
or discomfort from performing nontraditional jobs. This belief may make it
more likely that courts will accept employers’ claims of a lack-of-interest
defense in cases in which women have been excluded from nontraditional
jobs. In her seminal article about the lack-of-interest defense, Vicki Schultz
described the importance for blue-collar employers of describing jobs as
physically “dirty.”206 Schultz explained that acceptance of the lack-ofinterest defense often followed “merely as a matter of ‘common sense’”
from the courts’ acceptance of such a job description.207 To the extent that
femininity continues to be associated with concerns about dress, beauty, and
appearance, women’s exclusion from “dirty” jobs will continue to appear, at
least plausibly, to be a matter of women’s choice.
Perhaps even more troubling, however, is the fact that judicial conceptions of gender may become real—affecting how people view themselves,
what they aspire to, and what they ultimately accomplish. Those who
identify as gender female may, for example, come to believe that they really
are, and must be, most comfortable wearing skirts and makeup. Hence they
may shy away from jobs that require masculine attire and dirty physical
labor. Those who identify as gender male may come to believe that they
really are, and must be, aggressive and competitive. Hence they may shy
away from jobs that require nurturing and caregiving.208 Legal scripts about
206 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749,
1801-02 (1990) (arguing that, by using “heavily gendered terms” to describe nontraditional work,
employers invoke masculine images that influence courts’ decisionmaking).
207 Id. at 1802.
208 Richard Ford has identified a similar danger in the race context, explaining:

[T]he harm of misrecognition is that members of the misrecognized group may
internalize the deprecating stereotypes of others. Such individuals, then, may not
always appropriately determine what is fundamental to their identity, or better put,
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gender do have the power to shape the actual lives of women and men.209
The irony of the recent sex discrimination victories of gender nonconforming
workers is that the sex stereotyping prohibition is being applied in such a
way as to give even progressive courts an incentive to adopt highly essentialized and traditional conceptions of masculinity and femininity.
CONCLUSION
The sex stereotyping prohibition certainly has brought about dramatic
changes in antidiscrimination law. It has led to critical workplace protection
for groups and individuals who were previously excluded from the law’s
protection. Yet the prohibition has not delivered on its sweeping rhetorical
promise. It has not put an end to gender stereotypes or the enforcement of
gender codes and categories in the workplace. It has not led to workplaces
in which gender is expressed freely, creatively, and idiosyncratically.
Instead, its change has been more incremental.
Courts have interpreted the prohibition in a highly pragmatic fashion—
hewing to a middle road that responds to demands both for employee
inclusion and for employer control. Under this compromise approach,
gender conformity demands are loosened only when they are particularly
what should be fundamental to their identity. If misrecognition can lead people to
fail to take advantage of opportunities even after “objective obstacles to their
advancement fall away,” then misrecognition might also lead those same people to
push for rights to self-detrimental traits and adopt misconceived legal strategies in
the name of safeguarding an identity that was shaped by the misrecognition of others.
Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 55 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
209 For a similar point about the dangers of entrenched categories in other contexts, see K.
Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149, 162 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1994) (“Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some
scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper
ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made.”);
Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811 (2000) (“The rights
argument that protects culture as the authentic expression of the individual litigant must invite—
in fact it must require—courts to determine which expressions are authentic and therefore
deserving of protection. The result will often be to discredit anyone who does not fit the culture
style ascribed to her racial group.”); Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the
Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 117 (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“[I]f advocacy constructs identity, if it generates a script that identity
bearers must heed, and if that script restricts group members, then identity politics compels its
beneficiaries. Identity politics suddenly is no longer mere or simple resistance: It begins to look
like power . . . . [W]henever activists invoke identity in ways that transform it, they may approach
and even cross the dangerous line . . . between advocacy and coercion; they may interpellate
subjects just as invidiously as Althusser’s imagined cop in the street.”).
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burdensome or debilitating—either personally or professionally—for an
individual worker. Only then are employers required to justify the demand.
When the demands instead seem modest, courts avoid a fight, leave societal
norms intact, and simply tell employees to play along. Employers need offer
no justification for the demand.
Although disappointing for those hoping for more radical change, the
burden-shifting framework actually has much to recommend it. It will
neither transcend gender, nor radically transform the workplace, but it does
protect those who are most in need of protection and least able to exercise
self-help. Moreover, by limiting the scope of protection, the approach
avoids an all-out assault on gender norms and lessens the risk of popular
backlash against courts and nonconformists.
Yet the prohibition-as-burden-shifting framework raises its own risks—
risks which have not been previously recognized. In particular, it encourages
gender nonconformists to adopt more highly dysphoric gender packages
than they otherwise might, in order to bolster their claims that, for them,
noncompliance is necessary. Whether pressure on gender nonconformists to
over-perform their dysphoria is any worse than pressure to over-perform
their sex-based gender code is a question about which I am agnostic.
However, the pressure reinforces that—for those who do care deeply about
free and authentic gender expression—the prohibition will not be a panacea,
and that other sources of protection, whether legal or social, should be
pursued.210
More troubling is the fact that the burden-shifting framework, with its
focus on compliance costs and threshold tests, encourages a medicalization
of gender that threatens to entrench traditional notions of masculinity and
femininity. The danger here flows not from burden shifting per se but from
the type of medical evidence on which courts have been encouraged to rely
in sex stereotyping cases. The result is a pitting of the interests of the
individual plaintiff against the interests of women as a group, with individual plaintiffs relying on medical evidence that reinforces the very stereotypes that have been instrumental in women’s subordination.
210 See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance
Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2006) (arguing that “the legal
framework of autonomy privacy is a necessary supplement to the discrimination analysis that has
dominated legal thinking for thirty-five years of challenges to workplace appearance requirements”
(footnote omitted)) and Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 467, 488 (2007) (suggesting that strengthening unions could provide protection to
workers like Jespersen, even when antidiscrimination law does not, because it is “the current
imbalance of power that allows employers to impose many oppressive conditions that individual
employees are left largely powerless to confront”).
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Given the importance of medical evidence in the transsexual sex discrimination cases, the best (and perhaps the only) possible response to this danger
is to urge advocates for transsexuals and other gender nonconformists to
present their expert medical testimony in a more nuanced way—to highlight, rather than elide, the differences among transsexuals, and to avoid
linking the gender experiences of transsexuals with those of nontranssexuals.
Transsexuals should win under a burden-shifting framework even if they do
not experience their gender identity in precisely the same ways as nontranssexuals. Treating transsexualism as a distinctive gender experience will
reduce the danger that the essentialism so prevalent in the current diagnosis
of GID will carry over into courts’ thinking about, and treatment of, women
and men generally.
I have tried in this Article to look inside the black box of the sex stereotyping prohibition to see how the prohibition works in practice, as opposed
to in theory or aspiration. One benefit of such added clarity is that it may
help advocates for nonconformists marshal evidence and structure arguments to help their cases and expand protection for clients. It may also
highlight what additional work needs to be done and what precautions
should be taken. In this case, greater clarity seemingly does all three.
Indeed, if my reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition at work is correct,
it suggests that not only is the prohibition’s protection likely to be narrower
than generally thought, but also that this incremental change may come at
the expense of a subtle hardening of gender expectations for everyone.

